Maryland Law Review
Volume 68 | Issue 1

The Law of Termination: Doing More with Less
Jeffrey M. Hirsch

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More with Less, 68 Md. L. Rev. 89 (2008)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol68/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Article 4

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\mlr102.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

25-NOV-08

13:37

THE LAW OF TERMINATION: DOING MORE WITH LESS
JEFFREY M. HIRSCH*
Today’s regulation of the workplace consists of a confused web
of rules derived from multiple sources of law. Nowhere is this confusion more apparent than the governance of terminations. In addition to the scores of federal laws that apply to the end of the
employment relationship, state and local governments have their own
set of termination rules, which may or may not track the federal
rules. The result is a patchwork of regulations that often require
parties to apply different standards and to pursue claims in multiple
forums for the same dispute. This complexity also makes it difficult
for employers and employees to understand, comply with, and enforce
termination rules. Those difficulties, in turn, undermine the rules’
effectiveness and produce a system of workplace regulations that often
fails to achieve its goals. In response to this problem, this Article
proposes a universal “law of termination.” This federal law would
replace all current state, local, and federal rules governing terminations. The central substantive provision of the proposed law would
be a prohibition against terminations that lack a reasonable business
justification. The proposal’s central aim, however, is not to promote
unjust dismissal protection on its merits. Rather, the Article takes a
pragmatic approach to workplace regulation and argues, perhaps
counter-intuitively, that we can better achieve the goals of today’s
termination rules by replacing them with a single law of termination.
The laws and regulations governing the American workplace reveal a level of complexity and uncertainty that rivals virtually any other
area of law. Literally hundreds of federal, state, and local laws may
apply to a given workplace. Deciphering the application and requirements of these laws require resources and skills that few employers,
and even fewer employees, possess. This complexity, however, affects
more than employees and employers; difficulties in understanding,
complying with, and enforcing today’s workplace rules means that the
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policy goals underlying those rules suffer as well. In short, the current
workplace regulatory system is standing in the way of its own policies.
This problem is best illustrated by rules governing the end of the
employment relationship. Each jurisdiction has its own set of laws and
regulations governing terminations.1 Some of these rules are identical to other jurisdictions’ rules, some are similar, and some are completely at odds with others.2 Such complexity makes compliance and
enforcement difficult.3 That difficulty is especially troubling given the
importance of terminations. Cases involving the end of the employment relationship make up a large percentage of employment litigation.4 Terminations also impose far more costs on employees than
other employment actions, such as demotions or refusals to hire.5
This significance makes the complex and often duplicative nature of
the current patchwork of termination rules all the more troubling.
The problems with the current system of termination rules are
unfortunate for many reasons, not the least of which is because they
are unnecessary. These rules have developed over time, with little to
no attention focused on the regulatory structure as a whole. A more
holistic approach to the system of termination rules would reveal that,
despite their many differences, a common thread exists. Whether a
termination is challenged under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”),6 Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),7 the
1. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 11.03, at 11-15 (5th
ed. Supp. 2008) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL].
2. See Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 398–99 (2002) (explaining the interaction
between federal and state claims, statutory, and common law claims).
3. Id. at 397 (“The current landscape, particularly in the context of employment termination, is garbled by a maze of potential claims and forums. The parties involved in an
employment termination lawsuit, as well as the judiciary, must divert considerable time and
attention to navigating this maze.”).
4. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015 (1991) (stating that, in 1985, there were
six charges of discriminatory terminations for every charge of discriminatory hiring).
Overall, employment-related cases made up over 13% of all U.S. district court civil actions
commenced from March 31, 2005 to March 31, 2006. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS Table C-2 (2007), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2006/tables/C02_Mar_06.pdf.
5. LOUIS JACOBSON ET AL., THE COSTS OF WORKER DISLOCATION 137, 144–45 (1993)
(estimating lifetime loss of earnings caused by termination as approximately $70,000 for
employee earning approximately $24,000 a year); see also Daniel J. Libenson, Leasing
Human Capital: Toward a New Foundation for Employment Termination Law, 27 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 111, 147–50 (2006) (discussing costs of termination and clarifying the estimate of JACOBSON, supra).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (2000).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–17 (2000).
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National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”),8 or the plethora of other
state and federal laws9 that govern terminations, some form of business justification defense is typically available to employers, albeit in
many different forms. This commonality raises questions about the
need for such a wide variety of termination rules. In particular, why
make employers’ obligations turn on geography, employee characteristics,10 and other factors that are unrelated to employers’ business
autonomy? If, as a matter of public policy, we want to allow employers
some degree of freedom to fire employees, why not just say that?
This Article concludes that the costs of having numerous laws
governing terminations outweigh whatever benefits they may provide.
Clarity and simplicity should be regulatory virtues, particularly because those factors directly affect the realization of the current workplace regulatory system’s policy goals. This Article argues that
simplifying the governance of terminations would better achieve those
goals, as demonstrated by the proposed “law of termination.”
The law of termination would supplant all rules regulating terminations with a single, non-waivable, universal law. “All” is used deliberately, as the law would have exclusive governance over every
termination in the country, no matter what federal or state11 laws currently apply. Although this Article recommends various details for the
law of termination,12 the law could take many forms. This is because
the law’s chief aim differs from other unjust dismissal proposals.13
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2000).
9. Unless otherwise indicated, the term “laws” is intended to include state common
law claims, in addition to statutory and administrative measures.
10. At times, policymakers may purposefully grant different protections for certain
characteristics. See infra note 231 and accompanying text. Eliminating such distinctions
may be a cost of the law of termination, but one that is likely outweighed by the benefits of
the law.
11. Although local governments may have their own laws, for the sake of simplicity,
“state” will be used to denote state and local, unless noted otherwise.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra note 18. For comparisons of at-will and just cause termination regimes that
focus on their respective economic efficiency, see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 951 (1984); Alan B. Krueger, The Evolution of UnjustDismissal Legislation in the United States, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 644, 645–46 (1991);
David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform: Employment At Will
Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 979 (1998); Andrew P. Morriss, Bad Data, Bad
Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful Discharge Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901, 1904
(1996); J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts:
Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 842. Although these economic questions are important, this Article does not argue that the proposed law of termination’s
business justification requirement is superior to the current at-will default in an economic
sense. Rather, the Article addresses some of the economic ramifications of the proposed
law of termination in Part IV.B only to support the argument that the law of termination

R

R

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\mlr102.txt

92

unknown

Seq: 4

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

25-NOV-08

13:37

[VOL. 68:89

The law does not promote a particular substantive rule—such as just
cause14 or a reasonable business justification requirement15—as a
means to give additional protections for employees, although there
may be good reasons to do so. Rather, the intent behind the law of
termination is to provide a more effective alternative to current workplace enforcement. Although this new approach is applicable in a
wide variety of circumstances, this Article accepts today’s system of
workplace polices as a given. These policies, particularly ones involving terminations, have been ill-served by the current regulatory
scheme. The law of termination, however, represents a means to improve enforcement of these policies. The law, perhaps ironically,
would do so by eliminating those very rules.
This Article does not suggest that existing termination policies
are without fault. Instead, it uses these policies to show how policymakers might improve enforcement of any given workplace regulatory
system. In particular, the argument for a radical new approach to the
regulation of terminations is part of a more general suggestion that
policymakers take a pragmatic, rather than theoretical, approach to
workplace governance.16 Using what is referred to as “regulatory
pragmatism,” policymakers would attempt to determine the actual impact and outcomes of their policy choices. This pragmatic approach
implicates two major enforcement problems in the current workplace
regulatory scheme: multiple sources of law, and a unique and unjustifiably complex set of rules within each jurisdiction. This Article proposes the law of termination as the answer to these concerns by
would do a better job of satisfying society’s termination-related policy goals than the current system.
14. The definition of “just cause,” itself, is often inexact. Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R.
Nolan, Toward a Theory of “Just Cause” in Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594,
599–601. The basic premise behind just cause, however, is that—unlike the at-will default
that currently exists in all but one state—an employer must have some valid reason to
terminate an employee. See id. at 594–95 (noting the standards used in cases to determine
whether an employer had a sufficiently “just” reason to terminate an employee).
15. See infra Part III.A.2.
16. This argument and a broader proposal to eliminate state authority over the workplace is explained further in Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking States out of the Workplace, 117 YALE
L.J. POCKET PART 225, 225 (2008), http://yalelawjournal.org/content/view/659/14/; Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Regulatory Pragmatism at Work 1, 4–5 (Mar. 21, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Regulatory Pragmatism]; and Paul M. Secunda &
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Workplace Federalism, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 26 (2008), http://
www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/WorkplaceFederalism.pdf (debate between Paul M.
Secunda and Jeffrey M. Hirsch regarding whether the federal government or the states can
best protect worker rights). But see Paul M. Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation to Address Workplace Captive Audience Meetings in the United States, 29 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 209, 214 (2008) (arguing for more state authority to prohibit workplace captive
audience meetings).
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vertically integrating the multiple sources of law and horizontally integrating the rules within the lone remaining jurisdiction. The result
would be a single, national approach to terminations that would operate far more effectively than the current patchwork of federal and
state rules.17
Proposals for some type of just cause requirement are not new.
Many individual commentators, as well as the Uniform Law Commissioners, have proposed similar laws in the past.18 Interestingly, all of
these proposals keep significant portions of the current regulatory
scheme intact. The reluctance to upend the current system, although
understandable, undermines the potential gains of the proposals. A
more aggressive change is needed to improve the inefficiencies that
plague the current system.
The potential impact of the law of termination and its complete
preemption of existing termination rules would be immense. Most
obviously, a universal business justification requirement would provide some level of protection for the large number of employees that
currently lack any meaningful right against unjust dismissals.19 The
law would also introduce two major transformations in workplace law
by eliminating state governance over terminations and replacing the
numerous federal laws with a single termination statute. These
changes promise to significantly reduce the inefficiencies that hinder
17. For the sake of simplicity, this Article will refer only to terminations, although the
law of termination could easily extend to discipline, reassignment, failure to promote, and
other adverse employment actions. Gary Minda & Katie R. Raab, Time for an Unjust Dismissal Statute in New York, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1137, 1206 (1989); see also Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56,
76 (1988) [hereinafter A Seed Germinates] (arguing for broad just cause law because “an
extended suspension, a demotion, a denied promotion, or an onerous job assignment,
while not as blatant, can be almost as distressful” as termination). But see Jack Stieber &
Michael Murray, Protection Against Unjust Discharge: The Need for a Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 319, 337 (1983) (arguing that extending just cause beyond discharges would
dramatically increase administrative costs and be politically unpalatable).
18. See infra Part III; see, e.g., Lawrence G. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1435 (1967)
(arguing for a termination law that restricts an employer’s absolute right to discharge an
employee).
19. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Model Employment Termination Act: A Threat to Management or a Long-Overdue Employee Right?, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 45TH
ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 269, 270 (Bruno Stein ed., 1993) [hereinafter
Model Termination Act] (estimating that 150,000 employees per year are terminated without
just cause); Jack Stieber, Recent Developments in Employment-At-Will, 36 LAB. L.J. 557, 558
(1985) (estimating that 60 million U.S. employees work under at-will and that 150,000 of
the 2 million discharges each year are without just cause). Some large employers, however,
provide job security protection to decrease the chances of discrimination and other claims
that could arise from a termination. See infra note 344 and accompanying text.
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enforcement of today’s workplace regulatory scheme. Such enforcement gains help not only the employees who are the primary beneficiaries of workplace laws, but society as well.20 The law of
termination’s simplified governance scheme would improve compliance and enforcement with the policy goals of existing workplace
laws—even though those laws no longer apply to terminations. Further, by decreasing the risk of unjust termination, the law would give
employees more freedom to exercise or enforce a wide range of workplace rights.21
To be sure, the law’s near-term political feasibility is limited.
That infeasibility, however, is not a fatal shortcoming. To the contrary, the law’s pragmatic approach to regulation is important in its
own right. An aggressive examination of any proposed law—even one
that is never fully enacted—may help to prompt new insights and to
address serious problems neglected by a more narrow analysis.22
Moreover, even if we do not completely eliminate state authority over
terminations or streamline all existing federal rules, any reduction in
the current number of legal standards, definitions, and possible forums will enhance enforcement of the current set of termination
rules. The hope is that the proposal, if nothing else, will spur regulatory reform that will make workplace governance more effective.
Part I of this Article explores many of the problems with today’s
governance of the end of the employment relationship. Part II describes and critiques some of the major alternatives to the current system and its “at-will”23 default. Part III provides details on the
20. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 1655, 1656–57 (1996).
21. See Richard Michael Fischl, ‘A domain into which the King’s writ does not seek to run’:
Workplace Justice in the Shadow of Employment-at-Will, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: TRANSFORMATIVE PRACTICES & POSSIBILITIES 253, 260–61 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds.,
2002) [hereinafter Workplace Justice] (arguing that efforts to enhance employees’ workplace
rights cannot be successful without first eliminating employment-at-will termination).
22. See Andrew B. Coan, Well, Should They? A Response to If People Would Be Outraged
by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 213, 215 & 219 n.26 (2007) (arguing that examining deep questions in a fresh context can cast them in a revealing new light
and criticizing “minimalist” scholarship which, by “refusing to confront deep theoretical
questions can seriously limit the interest of the remaining avenues for discussion . . . [and]
can make superficial explanations appear more compelling than they really are while obscuring important deep theoretical alternatives”).
23. “At-will” is typically defined as permitting either party to end the employment relationship for any or no reason. Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884),
overruled on other grounds by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 137–38 (Tenn. 1915); Befort,
supra note 2, at 356. The at-will default has a long history in the United States. It began to
gain strength in the late 1800s and was the default rule in nearly every state by the 1930s.
See Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of
Employment At-Will, 59 MO. L. REV. 679, 700 (1994) [hereinafter At-Will] (listing the date of
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proposed law of termination. Finally, Part IV addresses the law’s impact on the current system of workplace laws, focusing in particular
on Title VII and the NLRA.
I. PROBLEMS

WITH

CURRENT TERMINATION LAWS

Much like the overall workplace regulatory system, laws governing terminations are numerous, complex, and unnecessarily confusing. Over twenty-five different federal statutes may govern
terminations.24 In addition, every state and numerous localities have
their own set of termination statutes and common law rules.25 Although there are commonalities among these regimes, there are numerous differences as well. Rather than signifying a reasoned and
comprehensive approach to regulation, these various laws are the result of incrementalism run amok.26 Policymakers are often wise to
cautiously develop a given area of law. Even gradual changes, however, if made with no attempt to coordinate with existing laws, are
likely to be ineffective or counterproductive. Today’s termination
governance system is a perfect example of this problem. Policymakers
appear to have created new termination rules with little to no thought
about their interaction with preexisting measures. The consequences
of this failure are serious.
The morass of termination rules means that a single set of facts
can subject employers to lawsuits based on multiple sources of law and
pursued in multiple forums.27 This redundancy imposes costs on
adoption of employment at-will by each state); see also Richard A. Bales, Explaining the
Spread of At-Will Employment as an Inter-Jurisdictional Race-to-the-Bottom of Employment Standards,
75 TENN. L. REV. 453, 455 (2008) (arguing that at-will spread initially among underindustrialized states trying to attract capital).
24. See PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 1, at ix–x (listing federal statutes that
govern termination).
25. See id. §§ 1.07, 2.10, 3.06 (providing a “state-by-state” summary of termination laws).
26. See Recommendations of the Administrative Conference Regarding Administrative
Practice and Procedure, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,629, 23,631 (June 24, 1987) (recommending
streamlining of over a dozen federal whistleblower protection laws with a “lack of uniformity [that] does not [appear] to be reasoned, but most likely reflects the incremental enactment of the various statutes over a period of years,” and that result in a system where
“available procedures and protections may differ depending solely upon the industry to
which an aggrieved employee belongs”). But cf. Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 11 (1993) (arguing that
common law wrongful discharge decisions generally mirror “life-cycle” model of employment, under which employees are more vulnerable to unjust terminations during the beginning and end of their careers).
27. See, e.g., Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796 (1986) (holding that employee’s
state administrative case did not have preclusive effect against Title VII claim in federal
district court, but was preclusive against § 1983 claim).
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both employers and employees.28 It is often difficult for employers to
predict ex ante the consequences of any given termination decision.29
Employees, in turn, face an uncertain strategy of which claims to pursue, when to pursue them, and in which forum.30 Costs are borne not
only by the parties, but also by the judicial or administrative systems
that have to decipher complex claims in multiple proceedings. Worse
still is that much of this cost comes with no apparent benefit. Although in certain instances a particular forum may provide specialized adjudication, there are few occasions where that benefit appears
significant.31 Moreover, even where a specific forum or source of law
provides some advantage, the costs associated with the overall complexity of the system appear much larger.
The multitude of rules also undermines many of the economic
arguments for leaving employers’ ability to terminate employees
largely unregulated. Under neoclassical economic theory, parties will
bargain to the most efficient outcome, which may or may not include
protections against termination.32 For example, most collective-bargaining agreements between unions and employers have some form
of just cause protection,33 which is the economically efficient outcome
if unionized employees are more willing to pay for such protection
than employers are willing to pay for an at-will relationship.34 Under
the neoclassical view, therefore, nonunion employees simply value just
cause protection less than employers value the at-will rule.35 However,
there are serious problems with this paradigm.
28. Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 205–06 (2007) [hereinafter Rethinking].
29. See, e.g., Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1470–71 (9th Cir.
1984) (discussing termination case in which employee pursued claims for state public policy tort after having Mine Safety and Health Act and NLRA claims dismissed after union
rejected employee’s request for arbitration under collective-bargaining agreement), overruled on other grounds by Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985); see also Krueger,
supra note 13, at 646 (noting problems with current common law system’s ex ante
uncertainty).
30. PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 1, § 11.03, at 11-16.
31. See infra Part IV.A.2.
32. See supra note 13.
33. BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 127 (14th ed. 1995) (stating that cause or just
cause protection is present in 92% of collective-bargaining agreements).
34. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV.
205, 219–24 (2001) (discussing the allocation of job security costs in the context of default
contractual rules).
35. A thorough analysis of this theory is well beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey L. Harrison, The “New” Terminable-at-Will Employment Contract: An Interest and Cost
Incidence Analysis, 69 IOWA L. REV. 327, 356–59 (1984) (discussing the possible values assigned by employees and employers to job security and discharge rights).
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One of the central assumptions of the neoclassical economic
model is that parties bargain with full knowledge of relevant information36—an assumption that directly implicates the complexity of today’s system of termination rules. Numerous studies have shown that
employees are severely misinformed about their employment rights,
particularly the lack of protection against unjust dismissals.37 This information asymmetry undermines the assumption that individual bargaining will result in an economically efficient termination rule.38
Employees’ lack of knowledge about their at-will status will often
prevent them from bargaining with their employers for a just cause
rule, even if they strongly favor such protection. The result is an economically inefficient oversupply of labor caused by employees’ acting
as if they were covered by a just cause rule even though they actually
lack such protection.39 The information asymmetry also eliminates
what would otherwise be competitive pressure on employers to attract
workers by giving just cause protection.40 If a majority of employees
with full information prefer just cause, employers will compete for
36. Id. at 355–56, 356 n.156.
37. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 119 (1999) (finding
that 83% of employees incorrectly believed that employers cannot fire someone for no
reason); Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of
Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 134 (1997) (finding, in a study
asking questions that Rudy later used, that 80% of unemployed workers erroneously believed an employer can terminate an employee for whistleblowing or hire another employee at a lower wage, and nearly 90% erroneously believed that termination could not be
based on employer’s personal dislike of employee or belief of employee misconduct); Jesse
Rudy, What They Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them: Defending Employment-At-Will in Light of Findings that Employees Believe They Possess Just Cause Protection, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307,
326–27 (2002) (finding that 77% of employees incorrectly believed that an employer could
not terminate an employee to hire another employee at a lower wage, and that approximately 84–85% of employees incorrectly believed that an employer could not fire based on
personality conflicts or a mistaken belief that an employee engaged in misconduct).
38. Sunstein, supra note 34, at 231 (“The fact that workers believe that they have legal
protection against arbitrary discharge is devastating to the suggestion that an at-will default
rule accurately captures the shared understanding of the parties . . . [and] is devastating to
the at-will rule as conventionally defended.”); see also PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE
WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 73–74 (1990) (discussing labor
market imperfections).
39. Because employees believe that their work conditions are better than they actually
are, more individuals are willing to provide more labor than if they were aware of the true
nature of their job security. See Christine Jolls, Employment Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 1349, 1376 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (stating that “inadequate employee-side information” about an employer’s ability to discharge employees
without justification “leads employees to oversupply labor”).
40. See Sunstein, supra note 34, at 229 (discussing the general ignorance among employees that at-will termination is the default rule for employment contracts); see also Estlund, supra note 20, at 1668–69 (noting the additional problem of job lock-in caused by
costs of leaving and employees’ inability to estimate risk accurately).
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workers by offering that benefit. However, if employees erroneously
believe that the law already provides just cause protection, employers
have little incentive to disabuse them of that notion.41 Information
asymmetries and other problems with the neoclassical model42 therefore justify increased regulation of terminations as a means to better
approximate the economically efficient outcome.43
It is true that, from an economic perspective, the law of termination may go too far in correcting for information asymmetries, as it
would not permit employees to waive their rights under the law.44 In
other words, the law could prevent an efficient outcome in instances
where employers care more about having an at-will relationship than
fully informed employees care about having protection against unjust
dismissal. This problem is muted by the fact that the number of such
instances is probably small. As noted, a great majority of union contracts contain just cause protection.45 Such contracts approximate
employer and employee desires generally, as unions are able to overcome asymmetries and other market failures that exist with individual
employee agreements.46 The union example, in addition to surveys of
nonunionized employees, indicates that a majority of employees value
termination protection more than employers value the at-will
relationship.47

41. Unions are often able to overcome this problem because they are knowledgeable
repeat players that can bargain with employers on behalf of a group of employees. Sunstein, supra note 37, at 257.
42. Another assumption under the neoclassical model is the lack of transaction costs.
This assumption often falls apart in the individual employment context because it may be
prohibitively expensive for an employer to negotiate terms and conditions of work individually with each employee. Id. at 225–26. The result is that even where an individual employee prefers unjust termination protection more than an employer wants at-will, the
economically efficient outcome—just cause protection—will not occur because the employer will not engage in negotiations with that employee. See also Jolls, supra note 39, at
1376 (noting the “adverse selection” problem caused by employers fearing that they will
attract bad workers if they are among the few that offer unjust termination protection).
43. See Sunstein, supra note 37, at 206 (arguing for a waivable just cause default); see also
James Robert Ward III, Note, The Endowment Effect and the Empirical Case for Changing the
Default Employment Contract from Termination “At-Will” to “For-Cause” Discharge, 28 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 205, 209–13 (2004) (arguing that the endowment effect—under which people value things more when they already own them than when they do not own them—
undermines neoclassical economic defense of at-will default).
44. See infra Part III.F.
45. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
46. Fischl, Rethinking, supra note 28, at 171–72.
47. Harrison, supra note 35, at 361; see also FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 37, at 130
(finding, in survey, that 67% of employees want more legal protections against terminations without cause).
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Beyond the economic debate is the reality that the complex system of current termination rules does a poor job achieving its own
goals. Because employer self-compliance is an important facet of a
rule’s effectiveness, difficulties in understanding and applying the
multitude of termination rules is a significant problem. That problem
is exacerbated by the expense of bringing claims and other impediments to employees’ challenging their terminations.48 Employees’
lack of awareness about their rights makes the likelihood of enforcement even more remote. When employees are unable to recognize
unlawful action by their employers, they will not raise internal objections to the conduct. Further, because most employment laws are enforced primarily through private rights of action,49 employees’
ignorance about their legal rights will often prevent them from bringing cases once internal objections, to the extent that they exist, fail.
The problems with the current termination scheme beg for a solution that provides more clarity and efficient enforcement. Given
the severity of these problems, such a change should be drastic. For
example, the law of termination would eliminate the costs associated
with multiple sources of law by abandoning the federalist model of
workplace termination regulation. National legislation, although far
from perfect,50 is the only way to ensure that the basic protections of
the law are actually enacted. It is virtually impossible to get all states
to implement the same termination rules—particularly in states that
actively try to attract business by advertising low labor costs.51 Only a
vertical integration of termination rules will achieve the conditions
necessary for realizing the enforcement gains discussed here.
A similar problem is that the termination rules within a given jurisdiction are too plentiful and complex. A better approach would
streamline and simplify the termination rules within each jurisdiction.52 The law of termination would accomplish this goal by replacing all federal termination rules with a single law that would achieve
greater compliance with the goals of the various termination rules
48. See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a RightsClaiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 879–84 (2008) (citing reasons why many employees
will not complain about workplace discrimination, including fear of social pressure and
retaliation).
49. The NLRA is a major exception, as the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”)
possesses exclusive authority to enforce the statute. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 160–61 (2000).
50. See Hirsch, Regulatory Pragmatism, supra note 16, at 36–40 (discussing problems
with national legislation, such as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act).
51. Stieber & Murray, supra note 17, at 336.
52. See Morriss, At-Will, supra note 23, at 682 (arguing that growth of employment atwill was due largely to its “benefit[ ] to judges [as] a simple, clear rule”).
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that now exist. Changes of this magnitude come with costs of their
own, of course, and there are legitimate disagreements about whether
those costs exceed the benefits. However, even if such dramatic
changes are viewed as too disruptive, the proposal’s stress on the need
to simplify the sources and types of termination law claims will hopefully prompt beneficial, if not substantial, moves in that direction.
II.

MAJOR UNJUST DISMISSAL PROPOSALS

Since Lawrence Blades’ seminal article in 1967,53 numerous commentators have proposed some form of unjust dismissal protection.54
The details of such proposals are important, as the ability to achieve
their goals depends on how the proposals would impact behavior in
the workplace and how the new protections would actually be enforced. Although these proposals serve as a guide, this Article’s aim is
quite different. Unlike past proposals, the central goal of the law of
termination is not to enact unjust termination protection on its merits. Rather, the law’s aim is to better fulfill the goals of the current
system of termination rules. Protection against unjust terminations is
simply a means to achieve the goals of other preexisting laws.
Because the key advantage of the law of termination is that it is
more efficient than the current system, the simple fact that there exists a single, universal termination law provides a large portion of the
benefits of the proposal. To be sure, the law’s details will influence its
effectiveness in achieving the policy goals of today’s workplace rules.
Yet, there is a wide range of suitable choices, and the recommendations that follow should serve as a starting point for discussion, rather
than a definitive statement of the best course.
Before setting forth the details of the proposed law of termination, a look backwards is warranted. Numerous unjust dismissal proposals and statutes already exist. These alternatives provide guidance,
both negative and positive, that will inform the specifics of the proposed law of termination. Three of these alternatives merit special
attention, as they represent distinctive approaches to this issue: Montana’s unjust dismissal statute, the Uniform Law Commissioners’ proposed model rule, and Stephen Befort’s proposed federal statute.

53. Blades, supra note 18.
54. See, e.g., St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates, supra note 17, at 70–80 (discussing the benefits of just cause statutes).
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A. Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act
Although a handful of states have debated unjust dismissal legislation over the past few decades, only one has actually implemented
such a measure. In 1987, Montana enacted the Wrongful Discharge
from Employment Act(“WDEA”),55 largely at the urging of employers
who were dissatisfied with the common law termination claims available in the state.56
The WDEA’s substantive provision incorporates common law
causes of action based on public policy, lack of good cause, and express contract theory. The Act prohibits terminations that retaliate
against an employee who refused to violate, or reported a violation of,
public policy; terminations that were not made for “good cause;” or
terminations that violated express provisions of the employer’s written
personnel policy.57 Good cause is defined as “reasonable job-related
grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job
duties, disruption of the employer’s operation, or other legitimate
business reason.”58
Not surprisingly, given employers’ role in its passage, the WDEA
limits employers’ potential liability. The Act restricts punitive damages to cases involving “clear and convincing evidence” of “actual
fraud or actual malice” by an employer.59 If fraud or malice is lacking,
an employee can recover a maximum of four years of wages and benefits, less interim earnings.60 Moreover, the WDEA does not permit
awards for pain and suffering, emotional distress, compensatory damages, or reinstatement.61 Finally, although the WDEA makes no exceptions for small workforces, it does not apply to employees who
work under a written contract for a specified term or to employees
covered by a collective-bargaining agreement.62
The WDEA contains several enforcement-related provisions. For
instance, before pursuing a WDEA suit, an employee must exhaust
any internal grievance procedures.63 That exhaustion requirement is
55. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -915 (2007).
56. Krueger, supra note 13, at 647.
57. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1). The “good cause” provision applies only to employees who complete a probationary period. Id. § 39-2-904(1)(b).
58. Id. § 39-2-903(5).
59. Id. § 39-2-905(2).
60. Id. § 39-2-905(1).
61. Id. § 39-2-905(3).
62. Id. § 39-2-912(2). Termination without cause during the period of time covered by
an individual’s specified term agreement would likely result in a common law claim of
breach of contract.
63. Id. § 39-2-911(2).
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important, as the statute of limitations is one year after termination.64
The WDEA also explicitly avoids preemption issues by exempting terminations that are subject to other state or federal statutes that give a
procedure or remedy for discharges.65
The WDEA contemplates different types of enforcement mechanisms. In addition to allowing judicial claims, the Act encourages arbitration. A valid arbitration offer by either party must meet certain
procedural requirements and, if such an offer is accepted, arbitration
is the exclusive forum for the dispute.66 However, a party cannot reject an offer to arbitrate without risk. A party who rejects a valid arbitration offer and subsequently loses the case may be required to pay
attorney’s fees incurred after the offer.67
Although an initial step toward a comprehensive unjust dismissal
law, the WDEA is quite limited in scope. It does preempt state common law implied contract and tort claims,68 but still leaves in place a
great deal of existing workplace law. In particular, the WDEA’s exemption of any termination that may have a remedy under other laws
significantly narrows the Act’s application, as there are a multitude of
statutes that cover claims for discrimination, whistleblowing, and numerous other reasons for termination. Moreover, the WDEA fails to
impose any procedural or notice requirements on employers; thus,
the information asymmetries that exist in the current system69 are left
largely unaffected.
The WDEA provides some additional clarity and predictability for
certain terminations, but leaves in place many other existing
problems.70 Any one state is limited in its ability to transform termination law nationwide, but Montana would have been better served by
taking seriously the need for more horizontal integration. The
WDEA’s narrow preemptive effect and its failure to integrate enforcement of state termination claims represent the Act’s primary shortcomings. A law that has any serious hope of improving the current
system of termination governance must do more.

64. Id. § 39-2-911(1).
65. Id. § 39-2-912(1). The exclusion of employees by collective-bargaining agreements
also avoids potential preemption issues. See infra notes 307–311 and accompanying text.
66. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914.
67. Id. § 39-2-915.
68. Id. § 39-2-913; Kneeland v. Luzenak Am., Inc., 961 P.2d 725, 729 (Mont. 1998).
69. See supra notes 36–43 and accompanying text.
70. For a discussion of some of the practical effects of the WDEA, see infra notes
347–357 and accompanying text.
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B. Model Employment Termination Act
The limits of a single-state enactment like the WDEA are contrasted by more comprehensive reforms. One of the most notable of
these proposals was made in 1991, when the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed the Model Employment Termination Act (“META”).71
The META is a proposed model for state legislation that has yet
to be enacted anywhere. In contrast to Montana’s approach, the
META imposes limits on its coverage based on employer size and the
amount of hours employees work. The META excludes private employers with fewer than five employees72 and employees at covered
firms are protected only if they work an average of twenty hours per
week and have worked for their employer for at least one year.73
The main substantive provision of the META proscribes the termination of covered employees without good cause.74 Employees
have the burden of establishing a lack of good cause.75 The META
also provides an explicit waiver provision that would allow parties to
waive the good cause requirement through an agreement that gave
the employee at least one month’s worth of severance pay, up to a
maximum of thirty months, for each year the employee worked for
the employer.76
The META does a better job than the WDEA of preempting state
termination claims, but still leaves much to be desired. Although the
META preempts most state common law claims involving termination,77 it leaves a significant portion of termination claims undisturbed. For example, the META does not apply to suits alleging
breaches of an express contract, or violations of a state or federal statute.78 Moreover, independent torts that involve facts separate from
the termination would survive under the META.79
71. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT (1999) [hereinafter META]. Theodore St.
Antoine, the Uniform Law Commissioner’s reporter for the META, has written an informative history and description of the proposal. Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Making of the
Model Employment Termination Act, 69 WASH. L. REV. 361 (1994) [hereinafter Making].
72. META § 1(2).
73. Id. § 3(b) (applying to employee who worked for employer “at least 520 hours during the 26 weeks next preceding the termination”).
74. Id. § 3(a).
75. Id. § 6(e).
76. Id. § 4(c).
77. Id. § 2(c).
78. Id. § 2(e).
79. Id. § 2(c) cmt.; St. Antoine, Making, supra note 71, at 374 (noting that the META
would not affect claims for assault, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment).
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Enforcement would occur primarily through state-run arbitration.80 Although the state would oversee META arbitrations, the parties would be responsible for paying much of the enforcement costs.81
Available remedies for successful employees include reinstatement,
backpay or frontpay for no more than thirty-six months, and reasonable costs and attorney’s fees.82 Compensatory and punitive damages
are not permitted.83
The META, although laudable in its attempt to expand employees’ protection against unjust terminations, does not go far enough in
remedying the inefficiencies that plague the current system of termination regulations. Rather than preempting all state common law
claims, the META instead adds an independent cause of action, while
expressly leaving intact not only certain state contract claims, but all
state and federal statutory claims.84 Maintaining these statutory claims
means that even if every state adopted the META, the current complexity and duplicity of the current termination regulatory scheme
would still exist.85
The META’s reliance on action of state legislatures for its existence is another shortcoming. It is unlikely that most states would
enact the law—indeed, Montana is the only state that has enacted anything close and it did so before the META existed86—and the chances
are even more remote that every state would pass the same version.87
Thus, the META would not resolve the current disparities among the
states, thereby leaving in place many of the problems of decentralized
regulation. At best, the META could serve as a step towards streamlining termination law, but the step would likely be a small one.
80. META § 6 & cmt. The META also contemplates other methods of enforcement,
such as private arbitration and judicial adjudication. Id. § 6 cmt., app. (presenting administrative and judicial alternatives for proceedings and remedies).
81. Id. § 5(e) & cmt.; St. Antoine, Making, supra note 71, at 380 (estimating costs for
each party at approximately $700–$1100).
82. META §§ 7(b), (e), (f); see Dawn S. Perry, Comment, Deterring Egregious Violations of
Public Policy: A Proposed Amendment to the Model Employment Termination Act, 67 WASH. L. REV.
915, 925 (1992) (criticizing META’s remedies for failing to adequately prevent violations of
public policy through punitive damages).
83. META § 7(d).
84. See supra notes 77–78.
85. This selective preemption has also been criticized as favoring employers because it
eliminates most claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation.
Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent National
Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1507 (1996).
86. See infra Part II.A.
87. Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the Model Employment Termination Act, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 849, 889 (1994).
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C. Befort’s Proposal
Almost all of the many academic just cause proposals have focused on the substantive merits of protecting employees from unjust
terminations.88 This Article’s pragmatic approach—arguing that a
new termination law should attempt to maximize the attainment of
society’s employment policy goals—is far different. However, Stephen
Befort’s proposal for a single META claim89 does much to address
these pragmatic policy goals, although it still centers on the substantive merits of unjust termination protection.
Befort uses the META as his baseline and addresses several of its
shortcomings, particularly with regard to pragmatic goals.90 A truly
pragmatic approach, however, would have gone farther.91 In particular, although Befort does much to streamline termination law, he still
leaves vestiges of the current system.
One of the most important changes under Befort’s proposal
would be to increase the META’s preemptive reach. Befort recognizes
that the META and the current system of termination laws can require
employers to defend a single termination in different proceedings,92
yet his proposal maintains the possibility of a single termination dispute implicating multiple standards, even in the same litigation.
Befort proposes that a single META claim supplants all other existing termination claims, except those that arise under collective-bargaining agreements.93 This proposal is superior to the original
META, but still leaves a potential problem. Although Befort would
create a single claim, this claim would incorporate all existing termination standards as part of a new good cause claim.94 This approach
is a reasonable attempt to maintain existing levels of protection under
88. For examples of such academic just cause proposals, see generally Blades, supra
note 18; St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates, supra note 17.
89. Befort, supra note 2, at 424–32.
90. Id. Ann McGinley has also proposed a federal just cause statute that would preempt many federal and state antidiscrimination actions. See McGinley, supra note 85, at
1448, 1511–24. Because her proposal is less aggressive than Befort’s, the following discussion is applicable to both proposals.
91. It is not surprising that Befort’s proposal is more limited than the law of termination, as he was not attempting to address shortcomings in the overall termination regulatory system.
92. Befort, supra note 2, at 427.
93. Id. at 428.
94. Id. at 428–29 & n.508; see also Kathleen C. McGowan, Note, Unequal Opportunity in
At-Will Employment: The Search for a Remedy, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 141, 166 n.162 (1998)
(arguing for universal just cause standard that does not disturb current antidiscrimination
laws).
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his proposed universal standard, but it comes at a cost.95 Consider,
for example, the termination of a fifty-five-year-old disabled employee.
Under Befort’s proposal, the employee would have a single META
claim for a termination without good cause. To make out that claim,
she could allege, among other things, that she was terminated because
of her sex, age, disability, and in retaliation for attempting to take
medical leave. Each one of these allegations would require different
standards, incorporated from Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”),96 the ADA, and the Family and Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”),97 respectively.98 Thus, Befort’s proposal would
simplify jurisdictional issues, but could leave in place many of the
problems associated with the multitude of laws now covering terminations. A better option would be a true single standard that obviates
the need to use different legal frameworks for the same set of facts.99
Befort also argues that his single claim would alleviate much of
the backlash problem that plagues antidiscrimination law.100 To be
sure, creating a single termination claim would reduce the hostility
that currently exists against laws that protect specific classifications.101
By maintaining the standards of those laws,102 however, Befort would
also preserve some of their accompanying backlash. Those who currently object to independent class-based discrimination claims are unlikely to be placated by Befort’s proposal. Although employees would
no longer be able to bring claims under a specific antidiscrimination
statute, they would be able to make the same arguments—possibility
with reference to the same statutes—in his new unified proceeding.
In short, by incorporating the existing statutory termination standards, Befort risks incorporating their backlash problems as well.
95. Thanks is owed to Stephen Befort, who further explained his proposal to this author as an attempt to have current workplace laws inform his just cause claim so that, for
example, an action that would currently violate the ADEA would also be unlawful under
the universal just cause analysis. E-mail from Stephen Befort, Professor of Law, University
of Minnesota School of Law, to Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Associate Professor of Law, University of
Tennessee College of Law (Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with author).
96. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2000).
97. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611–19 (2000).
98. Befort, supra note 2, at 428.
99. The proposed law of termination’s unitary standard would still consider employees’
discrimination claims, but those allegations would be factual questions that fall under a
single legal standard—not separate legal issues as could be the case under Befort’s proposal. See infra Part III.A.2.
100. Befort, supra note 2, at 429.
101. See infra notes 265–273 and accompanying text.
102. Befort, supra note 2, at 429 n.508 (stating that his “just cause standard would still
result in differential degrees of actual legal protection since existing statutes would be
encompassed within the just cause concept”).
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In contrast, the law of termination would do away with all existing
termination standards. Under the law, employees would still be able
to claim that discrimination motivated their termination and minority
employees would likely have more opportunities to make such a
claim. However, unlike Befort’s proposal, those claims would no
longer specifically refer to class-based rules. By eliminating the language and standards of current antidiscrimination laws, the law of termination would also eliminate much of the backlash that those laws
engender.103
Befort achieves much with his proposal and his willingness to address problems with today’s system of termination rules is commendable. The law of termination, however, would do more by providing
the type of structural reform that the current system needs. The hope
is that the law’s pragmatic approach to termination governance would
achieve more clarity, lower compliance costs, and greater protection
for the policy goals of today’s termination regulatory system.
III. THE LAW

OF

TERMINATION

The details of any proposal are obviously important and the law
of termination is no exception. Yet, the law’s aim casts its details in a
different light. As noted, the law is not intended, as are others, to
promote just cause on its merits or to argue for more workplace protections—although there are good cases to be made for both of those
goals.104 Rather, the aim is to improve enforcement of prohibitions in
current workplace laws. Accordingly, the proposed details focus primarily on the pragmatic goal of reducing the number of terminations
prohibited by existing laws, such as those motivated by discrimination,
interference with whistleblowing, and retaliation against employees
who exercise their rights.
A. Standards
The centerpiece of the law of termination is its governance of
employers’ ability to terminate employees. Unjust dismissal provisions
typically address two major concerns, which Henry Perritt has described as “substantive fairness” and “procedural fairness.”105 Substan103. See infra notes 265–273 and accompanying text.
104. See Estlund, supra note 20, 1669 (discussing social benefits of unjust dismissal protection); Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate
Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1833–34 (1980) (noting costs of unjust terminations, such as dislocation, emotional distress, job searches, and need to train new employees); supra note 88.
105. PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 1, § 11.02, at 11-6.
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tive fairness looks to whether an employer’s decision to terminate an
employee was based on a legitimate business need; procedural fairness addresses the employee’s attempts to evaluate whether the purported valid reason for the termination actually existed.106
The law of termination would explicitly implement both procedural and substantive standards. The procedural requirements would reduce the information asymmetries currently prevalent in the
workplace,107 while providing ex ante clarity that would help to focus
disputes over termination decisions. The substantive standard would
impose an exclusive restriction on employers’ ability to terminate employees by prohibiting terminations that cannot be justified by a valid
business reason.
1. Procedural Standard
One of the many concerns with our current system of workplace
rules is that employees are often unaware of an employer’s motivation
for a termination decision until litigation commences. This is unfortunate, as that information—although perhaps uncomfortable for an
employer to provide—can help parties focus on what true areas of
disagreement exist. Moreover, the lack of knowledge forces employees to guess at the employer’s motivation, which can lead to unfounded suspicions of discrimination.108 The proposed law of
termination would lessen these problems by requiring the employer
to follow certain procedural measures when it contemplates or makes
a decision to terminate.
Although most unjust dismissal proposals focus on substantive
standards, the procedural standard may be more important, especially
when the dispute centers on an employee’s job performance.109 Procedural requirements are particularly adept at addressing the gaps in
information that often complicate performance-related disputes.110
The law of termination’s procedural standard would impose two requirements on employers: notice of an impending termination and
justification for an actual termination decision.
Before any termination becomes official, an employer would have
to provide reasonable notice to the employee that it is contemplating
termination; this would allow the employee to rebut the employer’s
reasoning or possibly remedy performance problems that may lead to
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 277–278 and accompanying text.
PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 1, § 11.02, at 11-11.
See supra notes 35–45 and accompanying text.
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termination.111 An employer’s failure to provide notice of termination within a certain period of time—two weeks would be appropriate—would establish a presumption that its subsequent justification is
without merit. An employer could rebut this presumption under certain circumstances, such as an exigent business need or serious employee misconduct, such as theft, that warrants immediate dismissal.
For less serious performance issues, the notice requirement
would prompt employers to begin substantiating the required business justification112 for any future termination and thereby provide
employees the opportunity to address the underlying problem. More
generally, the notice requirement would give employees a better understanding of the employer’s expectations, which improves the
workforce’s overall job performance.113 A general increase in the
quality of work, as well as a requirement that parties address problems
earlier, would also prevent many terminations that occur under the
current system.
The other major procedural requirement would come into play
at the time of termination. It would require the employer to inform
the employee in writing of the reason for its decision and, in combination with the notice requirement, establish a detailed rationale that
would be the focus of any subsequent litigation. This information
would provide employees a genuine opportunity to challenge the reasoning behind a termination—an opportunity that stands in stark contrast to most state common law termination claims, which typically
give extraordinary deference to employers’ subjective conclusions
about employees’ work performance.114
111. See, e.g., Grief Bros. Coop. Corp., Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 555, 557–59 (1964) (discussing criteria for determining just cause, including notice of possible discipline). Many
European countries have long had such rights. Karen Paull, Note, Employment Termination
Reform: What Should a Statute Require Before Termination?—Lessons from the French, British, and
German Experiences, 14 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 619, 631 & n.78 (1991) (noting laws
in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands).
112. See infra Part III.A.2.
113. See Abrams & Nolan, supra note 14, at 610 (“[I]t is in the employer’s interest to give
employees adequate notice of their obligations.”); Ellen Dannin, Why At-Will Employment is
Bad for Employers and Just Cause is Good for Them, 58 LABOR L.J. 5, 11–12 (2007) (arguing that
just cause law would overcome employer resistance to informing employees about work
problems before termination).
114. See, e.g., Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 928 (Ct. App. 1981) (granting employer substantial leeway to exercise subjective judgment regarding employee who
occupies sensitive managerial or confidential position). Under what is generally described
as a “service letter” law, some states have imposed similar notice requirements that require
an employer to provide employees with a letter that describes the reasons for a termination. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 290.140(1) (West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-801(1)
(2007). This requirement is also a feature in many foreign unjust dismissal laws. See, e.g., 9
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The reasoning underlying a termination decision is crucial, for it
narrows the parameters of any subsequent legal dispute, provides employees more information about the justification for a termination decision, and forces employers to consider earlier whether and why they
should terminate an employee. Given the importance of such information, violations of the information requirement would provide an
independent cause of action.115 Moreover, to ensure the requirement’s ability to clarify disputes and to reduce information asymmetries, an employer would be bound in any subsequent litigation by the
justification it provided to an employee.116
The procedural standard would address several problems with
the current system, particularly the harms caused by inadequate information. Indeed, the procedural standard by itself would represent a
significant advance in termination law. However, the standard also
supports the substantive business justification requirement by forcing
parties to focus on that issue much earlier than they would otherwise.
2. Substantive Standard
The law of termination’s procedural requirements are important
for many reasons, not the least of which is their support for the law’s
core protection—the substantive requirement that delineates the
boundaries of a lawful termination. Ensuring that employers communicate the reason for a termination is important, but more is needed
to enforce the goals of existing laws, such as the prohibitions against
certain discriminatory and retaliatory terminations. Effective enforcement of our current workplace policies requires a robust substantive
standard, yet it need not represent a substantial threat to the longstanding concern for employer autonomy.117 What is needed is a substantive standard that strikes an appropriate balance between protecting employers’ latitude to make personnel decisions and prohibiting
§ Lag om anställningsskydd (SFS 1982:80) (Swed.) (requiring explanation for termination
upon employee’s request). The United Kingdom’s flexible hours law also has a writing
requirement. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process: Toward an Incentivized Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment Quality for Caregivers, 2007 UTAH L.
REV. 25, 75–76 (describing U.K. law requiring that employers justify reason for denying an
employee’s request for flexible work hours).
115. See PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 1, § 11.10, at 11-58 (citing cases providing damages for violations of service letter laws). Damages could include backpay until the
time that the employer provides the required information, and liquidated damages.
116. Montana had such a law, but has since abandoned it. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2801(3) (providing that an employer’s justification “may be modified at any time and may
not limit [an employer’s] ability to present a full defense in any action brought by the
discharged employee”).
117. See, e.g., infra Part IV.A.1. & notes 286–290 and accompanying text.

R

R

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\mlr102.txt

2008]

THE LAW

unknown

OF

Seq: 23

TERMINATION

25-NOV-08

13:37

111

terminations that are contrary to existing policies. The law of termination’s reasonable business justification requirement is such a
standard.
Substantive termination standards can take many defensible
forms. One approach is a general standard that, for example, would
require terminations to be made either with “just cause” or in “good
faith.” Alternatively, a standard could create a specific list of valid or
invalid justifications for terminations. Given the pragmatic aim of the
proposed law of termination, the best option is a general standard
that consists of objective118 and subjective inquiries into whether the
employer had a reasonable business justification for its decision to terminate. One example of such a standard would be a rule prohibiting
“any termination that was not actually motivated by a reasonable business justification.” A “reasonable business justification” would be a rationale that would lead a reasonable employer to terminate an
employee in a given situation.119
Reasonable business justifications would include a wide range of
situations. One set of reasons would involve employee misconduct or
poor performance. Although close cases will always exist, it is reasonable for employers to be able to terminate employees because of serious misconduct or performance problems.120 Another set of reasons
would involve business conditions that are unrelated to an individual
118. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68–69 (2006) (emphasizing the benefits of an objective standard).
119. This reasonableness test is similar to Great Britain’s unjust dismissal law, which
defers to employers’ decisions if they fall within a certain range of reasonableness. Michael
Bennett, Montana’s Employment Protection: A Comparative Critique of Montana’s Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act In Light Of The United Kingdom’s Unfair Dismissal Law, 57 MONT.
L. REV. 115, 132 (1996) (noting the reasonableness standard in Great Britain’s unjust dismissal law); see also Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., Inc., 769 P.2d 298, 304
(Wash. 1989) (en banc) (holding that “a discharge for ‘just cause’ is one which is not for
any arbitrary, capricious, or illegal reason and which is based on facts . . . supported by
substantial evidence and . . . reasonably believed by the employer to be true”); Wendi J.
Delmendo, Comment, Determining Just Cause: An Equitable Solution for the Workplace, 66
WASH. L. REV. 831, 838 (1991) (“[A] reasonableness standard gives the factfinder an objective guideline for determining just cause.”).
120. Off-duty misconduct is justification that can raise close questions. See Abrams &
Nolan, supra note 14, at 605–06 (citing examples, including a child-care worker who molests children away from work or a bank employee who is discovered to have been convicted of embezzling client funds in a previous job); Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law
of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L. REV. 631, 682–83 (1988) (arguing, as part of unjust
dismissal proposal, that off-duty conduct which “significantly lessened the employee’s value
to the enterprise or made the employee unavailable for work when needed, such as conviction of a crime entailing imprisonment, would justify a discharge, as would convincingly
documented production below the accepted norm in the workplace, or serious customer
dissatisfaction”).
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employee’s performance, but that require the elimination of one or
more jobs.
Both types of justification implicate the need for employers to
make termination decisions equally and fairly—in other words, the
reasonable business justification requirement would require employers to treat similarly situated employees in the same way. The absence
of equal treatment, such as punishing an employee more harshly than
others who engaged in the same misconduct, indicates a lack of reasonableness and would violate the law of termination.
If an employer’s motivation included both valid and invalid reasons, the law would employ a mixed-motive analysis similar to that
under the NLRA.121 Under this analysis, an employer would presumptively violate the law if an invalid reason was a motivating factor in its
decision to terminate.122 An employer would be able to rebut that
presumption and avoid liability by showing that it would have made
the same decision absent the improper reason.123 This approach differs from the Title VII analysis, which would impose liability on an
employer that satisfies this affirmative defense, but significantly limits
the available remedies.124 Eliminating liability in its entirety is the
more traditional approach,125 and it better reflects the need to balance employee rights against employer autonomy.126
In contrast to this general substantive standard, some just cause
statutes and proposals specifically enumerate which termination justifications are permitted or prohibited.127 The enumerated approach
suffers from the trade-off between inclusiveness and unwieldiness.
For the law to be manageable, there must be a limit to the number of
enumerated reasons. However, such a limit would invariably omit, in
the case of a list of prohibited actions, some reasons that would normally be considered improper.128 As an enumerated law attempts to
121. NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 394–95 (1983).
122. Id. at 398.
123. See infra notes 248–251 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 248–251 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Transp. Mgmt., 462 U.S. at 394 (NLRA claim); Mount Healthy City Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 276 (1977) (constitutional claim).
126. But see Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers’ Rights: The Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1, 64–65 (2007) (advocating for greater employee
autonomy).
127. For examples of statutes that enumerate permissible and prohibited termination
justifications, see Puerto Rico Unjust Dismissal Act, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185b (2001);
Virgin Islands Wrongful Discharge Act, V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 76 (1997). See also Nicole
B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will Employment and Just Cause,
87 NEB. L. REV. 62, 84–85 (2008) (proposing enumerated wrongful discharge statute).
128. PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 1, § 11.20, at 11-77.
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mitigate this risk by adding more reasons, the law would become increasingly complex. In contrast, the general standard would cover any
factual scenario, even ones that legislators never considered.129 Because this flexibility is important for both employers and adjudicators,
the general standard is preferable to an enumerated one.130
This general standard is admittedly imprecise and would create
some degree of uncertainty for an employer deciding whether to terminate an employee.131 That imprecision is purposeful, however. Attempting to fashion rules for all possible factual situations is a fool’s
errand that would add significant complexity to the law. The reasonable business justification standard, although vague, is much easier for
employers and employees to understand than a complex, albeit more
specific, set of rules.132
The lack of specificity is also not as troublesome as it may first
appear. Employers can create a large number of presumptively valid
workplace rules, thereby eliminating much of the ex ante clarity problem.133 Most terminations also involve clearly reasonable or unreasonable business decisions, whether or not they are currently prohibited.
For example, firing an employee because she is overweight would generally be allowed under existing laws providing for at-will termination,
but would be prohibited under the reasonable business justification
standard unless special circumstances exist.134 Similarly, most actions
that are currently unlawful, such as discrimination based on race,
would also violate the law of termination in most instances. Closer
cases would typically involve questions about whether an employee’s
performance or business circumstances reasonably justified termination—factual questions that no degree of legislative specificity can
ameliorate. Moreover, the law of termination would not begin on a
clean slate. Judicial interpretations of existing law135 would provide
129. Blades, supra note 18, at 1432.
130. See Minda & Raab, supra note 17, at 1193 (noting that termination statutes should
leave the term “just cause” undefined); Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against
Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 521–22 (1976) (same).
131. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Wrongful Dismissal Legislation, 35 UCLA L. REV. 65, 81 (1987)
[hereinafter Wrongful Dismissal].
132. PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 1, § 11.21[A], at 11-80.
133. Summers, supra note 130, at 502.
134. Special circumstances could include jobs where weight may impact the employee’s
ability to perform necessary tasks or create a health or safety risk to others, such as law
enforcement officers, jockeys, and flight attendants.
135. This precedent could include decisions under the numerous statutes and common
law claims currently covering terminations, as well as decisions interpreting just cause provisions in collective-bargaining agreements or under Montana’s WDEA. See, e.g., Stefania
Scarponi, The Present and Future of the Law of Diversity: Antidiscrimination in Employment and
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guidance to employers and courts about what constitutes a reasonable
business justification.136
Lack of specificity also naturally leads to some degree of deference to employers.137 Such deference may be too broad for employee
advocates, yet it serves several important functions. Although employee rights are a primary concern of our current workplace regulatory system, employers must have enough discretion to effectively
manage their businesses. This need is reflected by the fact that virtually all workplace laws carve out an area of employer autonomy. The
law of termination’s substantive standard, in addition to its caps on
remedies,138 would satisfy this need by providing employers with
enough freedom to make termination decisions when necessary.
Moreover, instances in which legal uncertainty affects the employer’s
decision—that is, when fear of a successful law of termination suit
stops the employer from firing an employee—serve as a warning that
the employer may not have had a sufficiently reasonable business justification. Although imperfect, the risk of losing a law of termination
lawsuit may prompt employers to self-regulate their termination decisions, which would in turn make the law more effective. Finally, to the
extent that the law of termination is politically feasible, significant employer discretion is needed to gain employer support or at least
dampen employer resistance.

European Law, 30 VT. L. REV. 693, 697 (2006) (describing European Court of Justice’s interpretation of “business necessity”).
136. See, e.g., Buck v. Billings Mont. Chevrolet, Inc., 811 P.2d 537, 540 (Mont. 1991)
(defining “legitimate business reason” prong of WDEA’s just cause requirement as “a reason that is neither false, whimsical, arbitrary or capricious, and it must have some logical
relationship to the needs of the business” and recognizing that application of that definition must consider employers’ discretion to make employment decisions, as well as employees’ interest in being employed).
137. Henry Perritt has also argued that a general standard might give adjudicators too
much authority to review business decisions. Perritt, Wrongful Dismissal, supra note 131, at
81 (citing ROBERTO UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 193–94, 197 (1976)). Yet, some discretion is needed to ensure fair enforcement. See Abrams & Nolan, supra note 14, at
611–12 (providing for a “theory of just cause” that includes language that requires use of
discretion in determining whether the just cause standard is met). Additionally, it is far
from certain that adjudicating a general standard will significantly interfere with business
autonomy. Such a review is likely to be deferential to an employer’s judgment and possibly
more deferential than an inflexible enumerated standard. See Summers, supra note 130, at
521 (suggesting that employers have already contributed to developing a just cause standard through “thousands of arbitration decisions”). Moreover, Perritt’s proposed affirmative defense, under which an employer can escape liability by showing a legitimate business
reason for violating an enumerated standard, Perritt, Wrongful Dismissal, supra note 131, at
84, is identical to the law of termination’s substantive standard.
138. See infra Part III.
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The superiority of the general standard is illustrated by its dominance in existing just cause regimes. Nearly every country with an
unjust termination law uses a general standard.139 Similarly, arbitrators have long interpreted general just cause or good faith standards
contained in collective-bargaining agreements.140 Some state and federal legislation have also used a general standard without any ill-effects, including Montana’s WDEA141 and the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”), which prohibits employment discrimination based on military status and provides general just cause protection for one year after employees return
to work from active military duty.142 Accordingly, a general substantive standard would be the best option for improving enforcement of
current termination policies.
B. Coverage
One of the more inconsistent areas under the existing workplace
regulatory system is the definition of covered “employers” and “employees.” These definitions are critically important because a law will
have no application to a business or worker who does not meet the
law’s definition of employer or employee. Thus, a narrow scope of
coverage would significantly limit the impact of a workplace law, while
broadening coverage risks interfering with relationships that workplace laws have traditionally left unregulated.
1. Coverage of Employers
The most common employer exception is to limit a law’s coverage to businesses with a specified number of employees. That num139. See International Labour Organization, Profiles of National Legislation covering
Termination of Employment, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/info/
termination/countries/index.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2008) (summarizing termination
laws of every country); International Labour Organization, R119 Termination of Employment Recommendation, 1963, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?R119 (last visited Nov. 17, 2008) (“Termination of employment should not take place unless there is a
valid reason . . . connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the
operational requirements of the . . . establishment.”). See also Samuel Estreicher, Unjust
Dismissal Laws: Some Cautionary Notes, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 310, 311–18, 320 (1985) (providing an overview of unjust dismissal statutes in Canada, Japan, and Western Europe and
finding that none of the statutes provide specific criteria of just cause).
140. Summers, supra note 130, at 499–501 & n.104 (discussing the well-established
“common law” of unjust dismissal arbitration under collective-bargaining agreements and
noting a 1975 survey finding that 79% of collective-bargaining agreements explicitly used
cause or just cause, although many also listed certain actions, such as unauthorized strikes
or dishonesty, as grounds for discharge).
141. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (2007).
142. 38 U.S.C. § 4316(c) (2000).
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ber, however, can be significantly different. At one extreme is the
FLSA, which has no numerical cut-off.143 Other statutes, particularly
ones dealing with discrimination, often exempt employers with fewer
than fifteen to twenty employees.144 On the other end of the spectrum is the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
(“WARN”), which requires employers with at least one hundred
full-time employees to provide notice of layoffs in certain
circumstances.145
Although small workforces are not immune from the risk of unjust dismissals,146 some type of exclusion is warranted under the law of
termination. Businesses with only a few employees often face a very
different termination calculus than larger employers.147 The marginal cost of losing and replacing an employee is generally higher for
small employers, which means that the cost of unjustly dismissing an
employee is higher as well. Because of this higher cost, small employers are likely to be more reticent to terminate employees without a
good reason. Further, applying the law of termination, despite its relative simplicity, to small employers currently exempt from most workplace rules would impose costs that larger employers do not face.
Allowing these small employers to avoid such costs initially may allow
them to grow enough to become covered employers in the future.
Given that the law of termination’s reasonable business justification requirement would produce fewer benefits at a greater cost in
small workforces, it makes sense to maintain some form of small employer exemption. It is true that other statutes, both in the United
States and other countries, apply to employers of all sizes.148 However, maintaining the exclusion of some small employers, in light of
143. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2000) (defining employer).
144. See id. § 630(b) (requiring twenty or more employees under the ADEA); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (2000) (requiring fifteen or more employees under Title VII); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(5)(A) (2000) (requiring fifteen or more employees under the ADA).
145. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101(a)(1), 2102 (2000).
146. Stieber & Murray, supra note 17, at 338 (noting that employees in small firms may
need unjust dismissal protection more than employees of larger firms).
147. Cf. Richard Carlson, The Small Firm Exemption and the Single Employer Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1197, 1248–50 (2006) (discussing small
employers’ disproportionate burden of complying with workplace regulations).
148. Some countries apply unjust dismissal laws to all employers. See, e.g., 1 § Lag om
anställningsskydd (SFS 1982:80) (Swed.) (providing that Swedish unjust dismissal law applies to both public and private employees and making no reference to size of employer).
The NLRA, the FLSA, and USERRA also apply to employers of any size, although both the
NLRA and the FLSA generally apply only to employers who engage in a certain level of
business per year. See 29 C.F.R. § 779.22 (2006) (presuming that $500,000 in annual business justifies FLSA coverage); Detroit Newspaper Agency, 326 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 700, 730
(1998) (noting the $500,000 threshold under NLRA).
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the relevant costs and benefits, seems the best course. Moreover, preserving some level of protection for small business may be crucial to
the proposal’s political survival.
Although no magic number exists, a reasonable option would be
to limit the exemption to any employer with fewer than five employees. That threshold is lower than most current workplace laws and
would ensure that the law of termination applies to the vast majority
of employees, while still allowing very small employers to operate free
from the law’s requirements until the employer become large enough
to be covered by the law.149 California’s employment discrimination
statute, for instance, has a five-employee rule150 and there is no evidence that it has imposed significant costs on employers.
A final issue is whether the law of termination should apply to
public employers. Because the size of the public sector workforce is
significant,151 a proposal attempting to address problems with the
overall system of termination rules needs to consider both private and
public employees. From a legal standpoint, covering federal employers is straightforward, as there is no question that Congress has authority to apply the law of termination to federal employers.152
Applying the law to state employers, however, raises questions of sovereign immunity.153 Although state employee immunity against individual lawsuits seeking monetary damages is far too complex to discuss
here,154 the likely conclusion would be that Congress cannot directly

149. This rule would exclude approximately 11% of all firms in the United States and
5% of all employees. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICS ABOUT BUSINESS SIZE Table 2(a)
(2004), available at http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/smallbus.html.
150. California Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926(d) (West
2005).
151. In 2006, there were 20.4 million public employees, constituting approximately 16%
of all employees in the United States. See Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union
Membership, Coverage, Density, and Employment Among Public Sector Workers,
1973–2007, http://unionstats.gsu.edu/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
152. The law, however, would need to permit claims that a termination violated an employee’s constitutional rights. See generally Paul M. Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of
Federal Employees?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1010243 (discussing First Amendment claims). Although this unavoidable claim
adds an additional level of analysis, it could easily be accommodated by excluding all extraconstitutional actions from the meaning of “reasonable business justification.”
153. See generally Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Can Congress Use Its War Powers to Protect Military Employees from State Sovereign Immunity?, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 999, 1002–1113 (2004) [hereinafter War Powers] (discussing state sovereign immunity). Counties and municipalities do
not enjoy sovereign immunity from private suits. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999).
154. See generally Hirsch, War Powers, supra note 153 (discussing the complexities of state
sovereign immunity in the context of employment law).
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abrogate state sovereign immunity under the law of termination.155
Despite this hurdle, Congress could enact a law that would allow individuals to seek monetary damages against most, if not all, state employers. By conditioning related funding on states’ waiver of
sovereign immunity under the law of termination, Congress could ensure that the law would apply nationally without running afoul of the
Supreme Court of the United State’s current state sovereign immunity
jurisprudence.156
2. Coverage of Employees
Even if an employer falls under a statute, some of the employer’s
workers may not. A worker’s exclusion is frequently the result of classification as either an independent contractor or supervisor/manager.157 Both of these classifications have gained notoriety lately, as
employers have aggressively used them in an often successful attempt
to exclude workers and avoid the need to comply with various workplace laws.158 Although these exclusions are defensible in limited situations, completely excluding a worker from the protections of a given
law is serious and should occur only where the worker’s role is one
that the law was not intended to cover.
The question whether a worker is an employee or independent
contractor has long been vexing. Indeed, current independent contractor rules provide an excellent example of the overly complex nature of today’s workplace regulatory scheme. The standard to
determine whether a worker is an employee or independent contrac155. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996) (holding that Congress’s Commerce Clause Power is insufficient to abrogate state sovereign immunity). This
conclusion, although the most likely given the Supreme Court’s current membership, is by
no means the only or best outcome. Recent cases suggest that the Court may take a caseby-case approach to sovereign immunity claims; thus, some claims under the law of termination—such as those demonstrating that state employers have a practice of discriminatory
terminations—may be sufficient to abrogate state immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726–34 (2003) (upholding
congressional abrogation under FMLA).
156. Hirsch, War Powers, supra note 154, at 1044–45. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 2008, S.
2554, 110th Cong. §§ 201, 304, 469 (2008) (pending bill that would enact conditional waivers under the ADEA, FLSA, and USERRA).
157. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) (providing that the term employee does not
include independent contractors or individuals employed as supervisors); Wojewski v.
Rapid City Reg’l Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338, 345 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding worker was an
independent contractor and could not bring claim under Title VII).
158. See Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and
How It Ought To Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 297–98 (2001) (describing
Microsoft’s improper classification of workers as independent contractors).
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tor differs depending on the legal claim at issue.159 Not only are these
disparate standards unnecessarily complex, they also raise the possibility that a given worker could be considered an employee under one
claim and an independent contractor under another—even in the
same legal proceeding against the same employer involving the same
set of facts.
The law of termination’s concern with simplification demands a
more unified approach. The most appropriate existing standard is
the FLSA’s economic realities test.160 Because this analysis is broader
than the alternative “Darden” or “right-to-control” test,161 it would allow more workers to enjoy protection under the law of termination.
This would partially address some employers’ abuse of the independent contractor classification to exclude workers who otherwise appear to qualify as covered employees.
Although meeting the definition of an employee is necessary to
enjoy protection under a workplace statute, it is not sufficient, as
many statutes exclude certain categories of employees. For example,
the FLSA specifically excludes employees who perform certain types
of jobs.162 Moreover, other statutes exclude employees who are classified as either supervisory or managerial.163 Some of these exclusions
reasonably reflect the policies of a specific statute, while others indicate little more than political pressure from a given industry.164
Whatever persuasiveness these exclusions hold under current law, the
goals of the law of termination demand a more simple and broad rule.

159. The default standard is often referred to as the Darden or right-to-control test,
which is derived from common law rules regarding a principal’s vicarious liability for actions of its agents. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992)
(setting forth multi-factor test for employee classification under ERISA). The other major
approach is the broader economic realities test, which seeks to determine the underlying
work relationship and applies to certain statutes such as the FLSA. See Sec’y of Lab. v.
Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534–35 (7th Cir. 1987) (setting forth criteria to determine the
economic realities of the working relationship).
160. See Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1534–35.
161. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–24.
162. Some of these exempted jobs are specifically listed in the FLSA, while others are
covered by the more general exemption covering certain types of executive, administrative,
and professional employees. 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
163. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) (excluding NLRA supervisors from definition of
employee); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 284 (1974) (noting that managerial
employees are implicitly excluded from NLRA).
164. Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial Discrimination in
the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335, 1336–37 (1987) (arguing that FLSA’s agricultural exclusion was political compromise to garner support from Southern politicians seeking to
maintain subjugation of blacks).
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The exclusion of supervisory or managerial employees from workplace laws, particularly the NLRA, has been a politically charged issue
over the last few years.165 Excluding certain high-level employees
from the NLRA has some logic given the potential conflict of interests
that could arise if a union member was intimately involved with setting
company policy, particularly with regard to labor relations.166 Even
outside of the union context, one could justify the exclusion of highlevel managers, as those officials are so tied to the firm’s decisionmaking that it is difficult to separate the employer from the employee.
Lower-level officials, however, share many of the same concerns as
other employees and deserve protection.
Even under the NLRA, the concern that an employee will be conflicted between loyalty to a union and the need to enact the employer’s policies is not present for middle- and low-level supervisors
and managers who have little to no influence over an employer’s policies. Outside of the union context, where the potential for conflicted
loyalty does not exist, the exclusion of these supervisory and managerial employees makes even less sense.167 This is especially true with
regard to a law that broadly prohibits unjust dismissals.168 In the modern economy, where a growing number of employees perform some
type of supervisory task, excluding all supervisors would gut the law of
termination. It is also difficult to justify excluding middle- and lowlevel supervisory and managerial employees from the law given that
they face much of the same threat to their job security as other employees. Moreover, a broad supervisory/managerial exclusion would
undermine the law’s goal of enhancing enforcement of current workplace policies. Although supervisory or managerial employees may be
excluded from certain statutes, like the NLRA, they are likely covered
by other statutes.169 Thus, to avoid excluding workers who are covered by existing laws, the law of termination should not adopt a broad
supervisory or managerial exclusion.

165. See Michelle Amber & Michael R. Triplett, Long-Awaited Ruling on Supervisors Prompts
Flood of Reaction from Unions, Management, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Oct. 4, 2006, at AA-3
(discussing the controversy and “outrage” created by NLRB rulings on the definition of
“supervisors” under the NLRA).
166. See S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 3–5 (1947) (citing such conflict of interest concerns in
union-management relations as reason for enacting NLRA supervisory exclusion).
167. See Summers, supra note 130, at 526 (stating that supervisory and managerial personnel are “among those most in need of statutory protection against unjust dismissal”).
168. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates, supra note 17, at 72.
169. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2000) (defining “employee” under Title VII as “an
individual employed by an employer”).
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High-level employees present a more difficult case. They do not
share many of the job security concerns of lower-level employees,170
yet other factors support their inclusion under the law of termination.
For instance, excluding high-level employees would require factual
determinations that add to the compliance and enforcement costs of
the law.171 A simple rule including all employees, even high-level
ones, would also create more predictable litigation outcomes.172 Accordingly, the law of termination should apply to all employees, even
those with supervisory or managerial duties.173
Finally, some just cause proposals would also exclude probationary employees.174 This exclusion could help mitigate any negative employment effects caused by the law of termination’s business
justification requirement. By giving employers a window—perhaps
ninety days—to freely terminate new employees, there are fewer costs
to hire workers because a low-cost exit strategy exists if that decision
does not work out. Barring this limited exemption, however, the law
of termination would cover the vast majority of employees.

170. Indeed, most high-level employees would likely have the opportunity to contract
for just cause protection.
171. See, e.g., 1(1) § Lag om anställningsskydd (SFS 1982:80) (Swed.) (excluding from
Swedish unjust dismissal law employees who occupy managerial or comparable positions);
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 288–89 (1974) (upholding NLRB analysis for
excluding managerial employees); Summers, supra note 130, at 526 (recommending an
English policy that exempts employees with two-year fixed term written contracts that explicitly waive the employee’s rights under the statute).
172. See Krueger, supra note 13, at 650 (citing surveys and studies that indicate that
damage awards and litigation costs in employment termination suits are more limited in
countries that require just cause dismissal). The law of termination’s preemption of common law termination suits also eliminates the potential for many large “lottery” awards that
currently are a risk in many states. See id. (stating that, in some termination suits, awards
to claimants have “exceeded the prize for winning the state lottery”). Employers are particularly wary of termination cases involving highly compensated employees; thus, replacing
that risk with a more predictable suit involving capped damages is more likely to garner
employer support. See St. Antoine, Making, supra note 71, at 373 (describing employers’
push to include high-level employees under the META).
173. The law is unlikely to be a factor for the few employees who make the most fundamental business decisions on the employer’s behalf, as it would generally be easier for an
employer to argue that terminating the most important employees had a reasonable business justification.
174. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(2) (2007) (default six month probationary
period); A.B. 3017, 1984 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2880(b) (Cal. 1984) (two years); H.B. 5155, 82d
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(c) (Mich. 1983) (six months); A.B. 1832, 199th Leg. § 1 (N.J. 1980)
(six months); see also 29 U.S.C. § 206(g)(1) (2000) (permitting employers under FLSA to
pay a lower minimum wage to employees under the age of twenty for the first ninety days
of employment).
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Burden of Proof

Many just cause statutes and proposals have taken very different
views on the appropriate allocation of burdens of proof. Because of
the law of termination’s unique structure and goals, this issue is particularly challenging. Ultimately, however, the law’s burdens of proof
should reflect the policies underlying its procedural and substantive
standards. This would be accomplished by giving the employer the
burden to show that it satisfied the procedural requirements and giving the employee the burden to show that the employer’s stated rationale for the termination did not constitute a reasonable business
justification.
The law of termination’s procedural requirements are somewhat
novel and have few examples to draw from. One example that does
exist is state “service letter” laws, which require employers to provide
employees with a reason for a termination decision.175 Those laws typically require the employer to prove that it gave the employee a valid
letter176 expressing a good reason for the termination. The employer
is in the best position to preserve and provide such information.
Moreover, if the employer complied with the procedural requirements, the burden is quite low; the employer need only reproduce the
information that it already provided to the employee.
The burden assigned to the substantive requirement is a closer
question. Most collective-bargaining agreements and European
laws—which lack the law of termination’s procedural requirements—
place the burden of proving just cause or its equivalent on the employer.177 In part because of its procedural requirements, the law of
termination would instead give employees the burden of showing that
the termination lacked a reasonable business justification. Once the
employer proved that it informed the employee of the reason for the
termination, the employee would have sufficient information to argue
that the employer’s stated reason did not actually motivate the termination, that it did not constitute a reasonable business justification, or
175. See supra note 114.
176. See supra note 114.
177. See Summers, supra note 130, at 513–19 (noting in particular that the unjust dismissal laws of Great Britain and Sweden require the employer to prove just cause). The British
just cause statute, for example, assumes that a termination is unfair unless the employer
can show that one of the enumerated valid reasons for the termination existed. Employment Rights Act, 1996, § 98 (Eng.) (stating that valid reasons include those related to the
employee’s abilities, the conduct of the employee, lack of work, or a catch-all “substantial
reason” justifying termination). An employer in Great Britain bears the burden of justifying the termination, but must show only that it had a reasonable belief that one of the
permitted reasons existed. See supra note 119.
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that other unjustifiable reasons were also involved.178 This burden is
not onerous, as the information provided under the procedural requirement is binding on the employer.179 Thus, the employee’s burden involves only a rebuttal of the employer’s stated motivation.
Moreover, giving employees some type of burden also has the advantage of helping to avoid, although not eliminate, frivolous suits.180
The law of termination would essentially impose a hybrid burden
scheme. Under this scheme, the employer possesses the initial burden of showing that it satisfied the law’s procedural requirements, particularly by giving the employee a reason for the termination. If the
employer is successful, the burden then shifts to the employee to show
that the employer was actually motivated, at least in part, by something that did not constitute a reasonable business justification. This
hybrid structure would assign the burdens of proof to the parties with
superior access to the relevant information and in a manner that best
clarifies the issues during litigation. The result would be an enforcement process that minimizes frivolous lawsuits while streamlining litigation of meritorious claims.
D. Forum
One of the most significant enforcement problems in the current
workplace regulatory scheme is the very real possibility than an employee will have to pursue claims related to the same set of facts in
multiple forums. Thus, the foremost concern in establishing the law
of termination is to ensure that all claims related to a given set of facts
can be adjudicated in as few forums as possible.
Until all workplace regulations are consolidated,181 the possibility
of multiple forums is unavoidable. However, the law of termination
could dramatically reduce the likelihood and magnitude of that outcome. By consolidating all termination claims into a single, universal
statute, the law of termination makes it relatively easy to establish a
178. This structure is similar to Title VII, where the procedural requirement is the employer’s burden of production and the employee can win by either disproving that reason
or proving that unjustified motivations were at play. See infra Part IV.A.1.
179. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
180. See Blades, supra note 18, at 1427–29 (noting the potential for frivolous dismissal
suits and therefore arguing that an employee should be required to prove “by affirmative
and substantial evidence” that his termination was unjust); Note, supra note 104, at 1842
(maintaining that an employee’s evidence of unjust dismissal should be required to meet a
“reasonable threshold” to avoid the potential for fraudulent, frivolous, or nuisance
lawsuits).
181. See supra note 16.
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single forum for most termination-related disputes.182 The main issue
is to identify the best forum.
Proposals to shift cases away from existing courts have existed for
quite some time, with the two most prominent alternatives being
mandatory arbitration and, to a lesser extent, specialized labor and
employment courts. Although both of these forums have advantages
over the current judicial system, their overall costs suggest that existing courts are the best, albeit imperfect, forum for law of termination claims.
Arbitration has long been the darling of just cause proposals.183
The appeal of arbitration derives from its promise of a less expensive184 and quicker adjudication system—particularly in comparison
to a judicial model that is often beset with high litigation costs and
delay.185 These potential benefits were part of the reason that Mon182. A possible exception involves terminations claims under a collective-bargaining
agreement with a mandatory arbitration clause. The law of termination could eliminate
this problem by preempting those agreements. A better option, however, would permit
arbitration of these types of claims. Although this option would represent an additional
possible forum for law of termination claims, that outcome is better than the alternative.
This option would keep all collective-bargaining agreement claims in arbitration. In contrast, if the law of termination preempted only termination claims under a collective-bargaining agreement, a single set of facts could result in claims being pursued in multiple
forums. See infra notes 305–308 and accompanying text. But see Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 498
F.3d 88, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that collective-bargaining agreement waiver of an
individual’s statutory right to a federal forum is unenforceable). Moreover, a union’s experience in arbitrating claims against a given employer neutralizes many of the problems
with arbitration. See infra note 189.
183. For commentaries on the benefits of resolving employment disputes in arbitration
proceedings as opposed to litigating in civil courts, see THE DUNLOP COMMISSION ON THE
FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT 49–60 (1994), available at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/2 (commonly referred to as the
“Dunlop Commission Report”); Befort, supra note 2, at 399–404; St. Antoine, A Seed
Germinates, supra note 17, at 77–78; Summers, supra note 130, at 482–84.
184. See Lewis L. Maltby, The Projected Economic Impact of the Model Employment Termination
Act, 536 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 103, 117 (1994) (noting costs of arbitration);
Kenneth C. Mennemeier, Protection from Unjust Discharges: An Arbitration Scheme, 19 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 49, 74 (1982) (stating that arbitration “tend[s] to be less formal, expensive, and
time-consuming than either litigation or an administrative hearing process”).
185. See Roberto L. Corrada, Claiming Private Law for the Left: Exploring Gilmer’s Impact
and Legacy, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (1996) (arguing that private arbitration may
provide “more justice” to employees than the “less efficient” public civil litigation process);
David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical
Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1563 (2005) (arguing that arbitration may be advantageous
to employers and employees because it is less expensive and faster); Paul C. Weiler, A
Principled Reshaping of Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177,
197 (2001) (“[R]eplacing costly and erratic public litigation with high-quality, private arbitration can enhance the legal and economic situation of workers as much as that of employers.”). Some studies have also indicated that employees may have a higher win rate in
arbitration. See Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F. L.
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tana’s WDEA made arbitration the preferred, although not required,
forum.186
Arbitration, however, comes with costs of its own. The use of unpublished decisions,187 the lack of any significant review,188 and the
potential that arbitrators will favor employers, who are repeat players
and can influence the selection of arbitrators,189 makes arbitration far
from perfect, especially for individual employees.190 Moreover, arbitration would undermine employees’ current right to a jury trial
under many workplace laws.191
Parties may also view arbitration as an inferior option. Although
Montana’s WDEA encourages arbitration, the vast majority of WDEA
claims were litigated in court.192 The possible reasons for this are varied. Employees typically favor juries because they are often comREV. 105, 113–14 (2003) (citing such studies). However, a successful employee may receive
a higher award in a judicial proceeding than in arbitration. Id. at 115.
186. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914 (2007).
187. See Recommendations of the Administrative Conference Regarding Administrative
Practice and Procedure, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,629, 23,631 (June 24, 1987) (recommending publication of federal administrative whistleblower decisions, which “should help narrow the
issues for future adjudications, contribute to a sense of fairness in the adjudicatory process,
and improve case management”); PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 1, § 11.20, at
11-77 (noting that the failure to report arbitration decisions reduces predictability and
expressing concern about difficulties in determining how to certify and assign arbitrators).
188. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) (allowing vacation of arbitration award only if award was
procured through fraud, there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators, the
arbitrators engaged in misconduct, or the arbitrators exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a proper award was not made); United Paperworkers Int’l
Union, v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (holding that “as long as the arbitrator is even
arguably construing or applying the [collective-bargaining contract] and acting within the
scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision”).
189. One reason that arbitration has worked well in the collective-bargaining context is
that unions are also repeat players. Individual plaintiffs, however, lack the experience and
expertise of unions, which eliminates the balance that currently exists in collective-bargaining arbitrations. See Sprang, supra note 87, at 911 (noting extensive union participation in
arbitration process).
190. See generally Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration at Gilmer’s Quinceañera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331, 359–90 (2006) (providing arguments against employment arbitration); see also Pyett v. Pa. Bldg Co., 498 F.3d 88, 92–94 (2d Cir. 2007)
(revealing an instance where employees sought to resolve an employment dispute in federal court and the employer sought to enforce an arbitration clause).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2000) (Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (2000) (ADA).
192. See Leonard Bierman et al., Montana’s Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act: The
Views of the Montana Bar, 54 MONT. L. REV. 367, 373–76 (1993) (finding that 67 out of 1,942
WDEA cases—approximately 3.5%—were arbitrated); Marc Jarsulic, Protecting Workers from
Wrongful Discharge: Montana’s Experience with Tort and Statutory Regimes, 3 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 105, 118 (1999) (finding, in a five-year sample, that 640 WDEA claims were litigated in court and 67 claims arbitrated).
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posed mainly of people who are employees somewhere.193 Another
reason, according to one survey, is that Montana attorneys preferred
court litigation.194 It is not entirely clear why attorneys held this view,
but it may result from an aversion to the unfamiliar—arbitration lacks
discovery and juries—and the prospect of lower attorney’s fees.195
Moreover, employers may have been disinclined to arbitrate claims by
low-wage workers,196 who often have difficulty paying for litigation or
retaining an attorney on a contingency basis.
In the end, it appears that the problems with arbitration, particularly with regard to the enforcement goals of the law of termination,
outweigh its benefits.197 Arbitration certainly has its merits and represents a reasonable option, but it is unable to provide the unified adjudication scheme that the law of termination needs. The other
alternative, a specialized labor and employment court, would provide
a single forum, although it would require significant start-up costs.198
A specialized labor and employment court, which exists in some
countries,199 could provide expert and efficient adjudication of termination and other workplace claims.200 Although the prospect of such
a court actually becoming a reality is unlikely, it could provide a single
forum that efficiently resolves disputes under the law of termination.
Moreover, creation of a new labor and employment court would presumably result in more judges, which would lessen the burden resulting from some termination claims moving out of arbitration and into
courts.
193. Id. at 119.
194. Id.
195. Id.; see also Bierman et al., supra note 192, at 375 (noting that attorneys also cited
perceived bias by arbitrators).
196. Jarsulic, supra note 192, at 119.
197. See, e.g., Sprang, supra note 87, at 911–13 (criticizing the META’s use of arbitration
because arbitrators tend to “split the baby” for valid claims and because hearings vary
widely in terms of process, evidentiary rulings, and adherence to precedent).
198. Other alternatives include requiring mediation or conciliation before an employee
can file a lawsuit, as is required in France and Germany. Summers, supra note 130, at 510,
512. A further option is to add law of termination claims to preexisting administrative
schemes, such as state unemployment insurance. See generally Janice R. Bellace, A Right of
Fair Dismissal: Enforcing a Statutory Guarantee, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 207 (1983) (arguing
for new just cause protection litigated before state unemployment adjudicators). Agencies,
however, also raise problems with the right to a jury trial and, like state unemployment
adjudications, would maintain much of the fragmented enforcement seen in the current
workplace regulatory system.
199. See, e.g., Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz [Labour Courts Act], July 2, 1979, BGBl. I at 853
(F.R.G.).
200. Such a court would presumably have jurisdiction over all employment actions, at
least ones in which the federal courts would currently have jurisdiction.
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Until such a court comes to fruition, however, the best option for
enforcing law of termination claims appears to be existing courts.
This procedure does not require dramatic changes from current enforcement of most termination disputes and it fosters the law’s aim of
eliminating multiple forums. Moreover, using the existing judicial system allows a court with a law of termination claim to hear related
claims as well.201
The risk of this choice of forum is that it will overburden court
dockets already faced with a disproportionate number of workplace
disputes.202 The law of termination, despite its radical changes, would
be unlikely to substantially affect the total number of termination
claims.203 Moreover, by greatly simplifying the substance of termination claims, the law would decrease the burden of resolving any given
case. To be sure, the law would shift claims that would otherwise be in
arbitration to the courts. This would be problematic if Congress
failed to increase the number of judges and judicial resources. Although Congress is typically reluctant to expand the judiciary, it is
likely that any Congress willing to enact the law of termination’s dramatic changes would also be willing to provide additional judicial
resources.
Finally, aside from identifying a specific forum, the sheer act of
funneling all claims through a single adjudicatory process would
achieve independent enforcement gains. For instance, a wide variety
of administrative and statute of limitations hurdles currently attach to
many workplace claims.204 The law of termination, by replacing this
patchwork of procedural rules with a single, straightforward complaint procedure would eliminate the potential for conflicting requirements and make it much easier to pursue a claim.

201. Both state and federal courts would possess jurisdiction: federal courts could hear
claims brought in state court under removal jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000 & Supp. V
2005), and state courts are presumed to have jurisdiction over federal claims unless Congress explicitly eliminates state jurisdiction. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S.
473, 477–78 (1981).
202. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 4, at 1015–20 (1991) (providing statistical
information about employment litigation); McGinley, supra note 85, at 1485 (stating that
federal courts have seen a “tremendous growth” in employment discrimination cases filed
in the past twenty years).
203. See infra notes 347–349 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Brake & Grossman, supra note 48, at 887 (discussing procedural hurdles
that an employee must meet to bring a claim of employment discrimination). The law of
termination would replace all current administrative authority to pursue certain termination claims. See, e.g., infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing NLRA). The law could, however, vest
authority to pursue claims in a single agency.
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Limits on Damages

The remedies available under the law of termination are important for the law’s effectiveness as well as its political feasibility. Remedies must be meaningful enough to discourage violations and to
encourage meritorious lawsuits, yet not so large that the law would
create an unpredictable lottery system.205
Damages available in the vast majority of workplace actions include reinstatement, backpay,206 and attorney’s fees; those remedies
should be available under the law of termination as well. Where the
problem of excessive damages becomes most pertinent is with regard
to compensatory and punitive awards. Although some workplace laws,
such as Title VII,207 limit compensatory and punitive damages, many
do not.208 The often unpredictable risk of an extremely large monetary award, even if remote, is serious enough to impose a significant
cost on risk-averse employers.209 Moreover, backlash against these
awards—whether from the public, employers, or judges—weakens the
support for and ultimately the effectiveness of workplace laws.210
The need to counteract the costs of unlimited awards necessitates
some limitation on law of termination damages. But the cap cannot
be too severe. In Montana, for instance, the limitation on monetary
damages211 seems to have produced a scheme that fails to provide
enough incentive for attorneys to pursue many meritorious cases.212
Adjusting the cap based on an employer’s ability to pay, perhaps by
tying the cap to the number of employees or some measure of income, would provide a feasible means of introducing predictability
into the remedial scheme. Looking to an employer’s finances would
205. State common law workplace claims, in particular, may carry the small possibility of
very large monetary awards. See THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, SEE YOU IN COURT 29 (2007) (arguing that the rise of tort-based employment claims has led to unpredictable lottery claims
and increased litigation generally).
206. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000) (NLRA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000) (Title
VII). But see supra note 61 and accompanying text (noting that WDEA does not permit
reinstatement).
207. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (2000).
208. See supra note 205 (noting the potential for large “lottery” damage awards).
209. Jarsulic, supra note 192, at 107; see also St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates, supra note 17,
at 69 (citing examples of substantial actual and punitive damage awards).
210. See infra notes 265–271 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
212. Bierman et al., supra note 192, at 375 (describing survey showing that 60% of responding attorneys might advise their clients to skip arbitration provided under Montana
law and go directly to court). Similarly, the NLRA also has been criticized for lacking sufficient remedies, particularly where a violation does not warrant backpay. Jeffrey M. Hirsch
& Barry T. Hirsch, The Rise and Fall of Private Sector Unionism: What Next for the NLRA?, 34
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1133, 1163–64 (2007).
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also help to ensure that punitive damages serve their purpose by exerting a significant cost to the employer that engaged in particularly
harmful behavior.213
Title VII has a graduated system of caps that are tied to the number of employees, but its maximum compensatory and punitive award
of $300,000 for the largest of employers is far too low.214 One million
dollars is probably a reasonable maximum for the most egregious
cases against the largest or wealthiest employers at this time, but the
amount should be linked to some measure of inflation to avoid a continual decrease in the law of termination’s deterrent effect. Moreover,
basing the graduated amount on the number of employees is only a
rough proxy for an employer’s ability to pay; however, given its relatively straightforward application, it is as good an option as any.
This limited remedial scheme would eliminate much of the lottery aspect of current workplace law.215 Employers would know the
maximum award they would face for a successful law of termination
claim. That predictability would allow for better business planning
and would reduce the risk and severity of backlash. The limited damage scheme would also enhance the law of termination’s political
prospects. Employers would obviously support a cap on damages.
Perhaps ironically, a cap could also achieve significant backing by unions, which currently face an anemic remedial scheme under the
NLRA. The only monetary damage available for terminations that violate the NLRA is backpay.216 The law of termination’s expansion of
monetary remedies—even if capped—would be a significant benefit
for unions,217 as increased penalties would give employers more incentive to comply with the NLRA, and unions and employees more
reason to seek the Act’s protection.218 Thus, the law of termination’s
213. See Paul M. Secunda, A Public Interest Model for Applying Lost Chance Theory to Probabilistic Injuries in Employment Discrimination Cases, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 747, 779 n.186 (“It is generally agreed that one of the central purposes of punitive damages is to punish an
employer for especially outrageous conduct on the employer’s part.”).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D) (2000).
215. See Befort, supra note 2, at 402 (describing current termination litigation as a
“uniquely American employment law lottery” under which most employees cannot pursue
claims because of expense of litigation, while employers fear high costs of defending such
suits); supra note 209 and accompanying text. But see Vanessa Ruggles, The Ineffectiveness of
Capped Damages in Cases of Employment Discrimination: Solutions Toward Deterrence, 6 CONN.
PUB. INT. L.J. 143, 155–58 (2006) (criticizing capped damages because they reduce
deterrence).
216. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11 (1940).
217. See St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates, supra note 17, at 69–70 (noting the benefits of
just cause termination laws for unions).
218. See infra Part IV.A.2.
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remedial scheme provides another example of how the law could better enforce the goals of current workplace laws.
F.

Waiver

Whether and under what conditions parties may waive claims219 is
yet another area in which existing workplace laws have taken varied
approaches, albeit to a lesser extent than some of the other issues.
The waiver question involves two scenarios: pre-dispute and post-dispute waivers. The law of termination would follow the typical treatment of these scenarios, which is to prohibit pre-dispute waivers while
allowing post-dispute waivers.
Employees are generally not permitted to prospectively waive
their substantive statutory rights, although there are exceptions.220
The ban on such waivers exists because most workplace rights, absent
congressional permission to the contrary, are considered to be a minimum level of protection that parties cannot contract around.221 This
rationale applies equally to the law of termination.
The law, like other workplace statutes, would typically prohibit
terminations based on many characteristics, such as discrimination,
that have long been targets of workplace regulations.222 As a result,
pre-dispute waivers of claims under the law of termination affects not
just the employee,223 but the public as well. Further complicating
219. “Claims” refers to substantive rights as opposed to waivers of procedural rights,
such as mandatory arbitration agreements that waive the right to a judicial forum. See
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (permitting pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration agreements that implicate statutory rights).
220. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974) (“In no
event can the submission to arbitration of a claim under the nondiscrimination clause of a
collective-bargaining agreement constitute a binding waiver with respect to an employee’s
rights under Title VII.”); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 1972)
(“[E]mployment contracts cannot be used to waive protections granted to employees by an
Act of Congress.”). But see META § 4(c) (1999) (allowing pre-dispute waiver of claims if
employer agrees to pay a specified level of severance pay to employees terminated for
reasons not involving willful misconduct); id. § 14 (permitting employers to make continued employment conditional on employees’ agreement to § 4(c) waiver).
221. See Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc., 237 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir.
2000) (explaining that employers cannot contract out of statutory workplace protections,
such as antidiscrimination laws).
222. See Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d 454, 460 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008) (arguing that post-dispute waivers are not possible under the FMLA
because the act was intended to create a minimum floor for all employees); see infra notes
263–276 and accompanying text.
223. See Sprang, supra note 87, at 905–09 (criticizing META’s pre-dispute waiver provision because most employers will be able to force employees to accept severance pay that is
often far less than the value of a meritorious wrongful termination claim).
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matters is employees’ lack of information about their legal rights.224
This information problem prevents efficient bargaining between the
employee and employer—an inefficiency that would result in too
many claims being waived.225 Even a fully informed employee’s predispute waiver threatens the success of the law of termination. A predispute waiver would allow an employer to discriminate based on race,
sex, religion, and other currently protected characteristics. Because
one of the law of termination’s primary goals is to better root out discriminatory terminations, pre-dispute waivers would not be permitted.
Post-dispute or retroactive settlements are a different matter. We
currently allow settlements, in some form, under most workplace
laws.226 There are exceptions,227 however, which represent another
example of the needless complexity and inconsistency in the workplace regulatory system—problems that the law of termination would
seek to minimize through a unitary approach. This approach would
permit post-dispute waivers. Such waivers are generally permissible
for good reason because, once the dispute has occurred, the employee has much greater knowledge of the harm she suffered and, if
represented by counsel, has more information about her legal rights
as well.
Congress has already created a suitable model for post-dispute
waivers. The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (“OWBPA”) sets
forth detailed requirements for post-dispute waivers under the
ADEA.228 Pursuant to the OWBPA, an employee can waive her rights
to sue after termination, but only under specific conditions, such as:
the waiver cannot apply to later disputes; the waiver was part of a written agreement that specifically refers to ADEA rights; there was specific consideration for the waiver; the employee was advised to consult
with an attorney; and the employee was given a specified amount of
224. See Note, supra note 104, at 1830–32 (discussing employees’ lack of information
with respect to their legal rights); supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text.
225. An economically inefficient surplus of waivers results from employees not being
fully aware of the rights that they are asked to waive. Some of these employees will waive
their rights even though they would have refused to do so had they possessed full knowledge, which constitutes an economic surplus of waivers.
226. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (2000) (ADEA settlements).
227. The issue of waiving claims under the FMLA has created a circuit split that illustrates some of the possible approaches to the issue, as well as the complexity and uncertainty that can exist within a single statute. The Fifth Circuit has held that parties cannot
prospectively (pre-dispute) waive employees’ substantive rights under the FMLA, but can
retroactively (post-dispute) waive claims. Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 321
(5th Cir. 2003). In contrast, the Fourth Circuit has held that the FMLA and its regulations
bar both pre-dispute and post-dispute waivers, unless approved by a court or the Department of Labor. Taylor, 493 F.3d at 460.
228. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f).
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time to consider the offer.229 These requirements provide greater information to employees about their rights—a particular concern for
the law of termination—and protects both employees’ and the public’s interest in rooting out age discrimination by ensuring that waivers
of ADEA rights are fair and voluntary.230 Congress could easily extend
the OWBPA’s requirements to the law of termination.
Prohibiting pre-dispute waivers of law of termination claims is
needed to make sure that the law has a chance of achieving its enforcement aims, especially in light of the information asymmetries
that plague the workplace. Permitting post-dispute waivers under the
OWBPA scheme would help to address information problems and encourages settlements. Most important, the law of termination would
impose a single waiver standard for all termination claims, and there
would be no need to treat waivers differently depending on the jurisdiction or legal theory of the case.
IV. THE LAW

OF

TERMINATION’S EFFECT

ON THE

WORKPLACE

A. Effect on Existing Termination Laws
The law of termination would have a significant impact on all of
the numerous termination laws that currently exist; indeed, the number is so large that it is impractical to discuss all of them. The degree
of this impact is governed by the details of each law and its differences
with the law of termination’s universal approach. Although many of
the law of termination’s advantages come from its universality, some
of the differences in today’s laws are purposeful. For example, age
discrimination is considered less serious than many other forms of discrimination and therefore gives employers a broader defense for agerelated discrimination.231 Although the law of termination would use
a single standard for all termination claims, the standard is broad
enough to allow for such differences—a judge, for instance, may be
more willing to consider an age as a reasonable business justification
than race or sex. Thus, the law of termination would be able to take
into account varied policy concerns while minimizing the complexity
229. Id.
230. See Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 427 (1998) (stating that
OWBPA’s policy is “to protect the rights and benefits of older workers”); id. at 436
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that OWBPA’s policy is to make clear that waivers are
knowing and voluntary).
231. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 288, 240 (2005) (“Congress’ decision to limit
the coverage of the ADEA by including the [reasonable factor other than age] provision is
consistent with the fact that age, unlike race or other classifications protected by Title VII,
not uncommonly has relevance to an individual’s capacity to engage in certain types of
employment.”).
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that has accompanied those differences under the current system of
termination laws.
The potential benefits of the law of termination’s universal approach is best represented through two existing statutes, albeit in decidedly different ways. The law of termination’s potential impact on
Title VII and the NLRA illustrate its possible effect on both the substance and the enforcement mechanisms of existing workplace laws.
Such changes are likely to improve achievement of the policies underlying these laws.
That the law of termination can improve the enforcement of existing laws may not be immediately apparent given the severity of its
changes to the current system. For example, supplanting Title VII’s
regulation of terminations with a measure that is not based on worker
characteristics would create a seismic shift in the symbolism of American workplace law. The effect on labor law would be similar in degree, but results instead from important changes to the enforcement
and jurisdiction of disputes currently falling under the NLRA.
Although Title VII and the NLRA are the only statutes discussed
in detail, the effects on these laws provide an illustration of the interplay between the law of termination and other state and federal laws.
This dynamic is one that, despite causing great change, promises
equally great benefits.
1. Title VII
Supplanting discriminatory termination claims under Title VII
may be the most controversial aspect of the law of termination, but
also the most beneficial. Title VII is a microcosm of the costs associated with today’s myriad workplace laws. The statute currently encompasses a wide array of legal claims, administrative requirements, and
remedial provisions—making the requirements and standards of Title
VII difficult for employees and employers to understand.232 It is not
surprising, therefore, that it is widely thought that Title VII is generally ineffective in meeting its goal of eradicating discrimination from
232. See Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913, 933 (1999)
(“Title VII’s convoluted analytical history . . . has contributed to resentment toward Title
VII plaintiffs because it is confusing and fails to instruct defendants properly on how to
avoid liability.”); Joseph E. Slater, The “American Rule” that Swallows the Exceptions, 11 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 53, 56 (2007) (citing Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate
Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2229–30 (1995)) (stating the view among
scholars that the procedural structure of discrimination cases is “unnecessarily complex
and confusing at best”).
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the workplace.233 Ironically, by eliminating Title VII’s application to
terminations, the law of termination promises a superior means to reduce workplace discrimination. This change will greatly simplify challenges to discriminatory terminations and lessen the current backlash
against Title VII that undermines its enforcement.234 For these reasons, Title VII is perhaps the best illustration of the law of termination’s potential to achieve the goals of today’s workplace laws better
than the laws themselves.
a. Effect on Title VII Defenses
Title VII’s complexity extends to all aspects of a claim. Even
something that should be as straightforward as a prima facie case of
discrimination has been enmeshed in debates over competing standards.235 These standards are the legacy of court-created analyses and
congressional modifications that, in many cases, have left parties unsure of something as basic as their pleading requirements.
In addition to problems surrounding its prima facie case, Title
VII has several different defenses available to employers, each of
which with its own distinct requirements. This complexity is troubling
because these defenses all seek the same goal of preserving some level
of employer autonomy. The law of termination’s business justification
requirement would maintain that goal, while replacing the various defenses with a single analysis. Indeed, the law’s efficiency gains are
well-illustrated by its ability to incorporate an employer defense as
part of its substantive standard. This single standard would improve
enforcement of current Title VII policies and would provide clarity to
an area of law that has long been lacking that attribute.
The defenses available in a Title VII action are dependent upon
the underlying theory of discrimination. The three primary types of
discriminatory termination claims under Title VII are single-motive,
mixed-motive, and disparate impact. Single-motive claims allege only
one motive for a termination and that motive was intentional, unlaw233. See generally Brake & Grossman, supra note 48 (arguing that Title VII has failed as a
rights-claiming system); McGinley, supra note 85, at 1448–90 (describing the failures of
Title VII to prevent discrimination in the workplace).
234. An even greater, and more beneficial, change would involve a unified approach to
all workplace claims. Yet simplifying hiring, reasonable accommodation, and other nontermination claims implicate issues beyond the scope of this Article. Such a proposal, however, is the subject of a forthcoming article. See Hirsch, Regulatory Pragmatism, supra note
16.
235. See Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead,
Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1930–31 (2004) (discussing validity of
the McDonnell Douglas test and motivating factor standards).
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ful discrimination.236 Mixed-motive claims recognize that an employer had more than one motive for the challenged termination and
unlawful discrimination was at least a “motivating factor.”237 Finally,
disparate impact claims involve employer actions that are facially nondiscriminatory, but that impose a disproportionate burden on a protected class.238
(1) Single-motive Defenses
Employer defenses to single-motive claims fall under two categories. The first is simply the “I didn’t do it” argument—the employer
states that discrimination in no way motivated the termination.239
This argument is not technically a defense; rather, it is a purely factual
rebuttal of the plaintiff’s case that the law of termination would not
affect to any significant degree. Under the law of termination, like
Title VII, the employer would win if the employee is unable to convince the factfinder that the employer acted based on an unlawful
reason.240
The second type of employer response to a single-motive claim
involves true affirmative defenses. The most significant is the “bona
fide occupational qualification” (“BFOQ”) defense. Title VII expressly permits an employer “to hire or employ” workers based on religion, sex, or national origin—but not race—if that classification is a
“bone fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”241 Generally,
the BFOQ defense is narrow and requires that the classification relate
to the “essence” of the business.242 This BFOQ test is quite similar to,
albeit narrower than, the law of termination’s reasonable business justification.243 Indeed, any successful BFOQ defense would necessarily
236. See Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 711 (6th Cir. 2006) (describing
briefly single-motive claims).
237. Id.
238. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (describing such practices
as “fair in form, but discriminatory in operation”).
239. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (providing an example
of this defense).
240. See supra Part III.C.
241. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000).
242. See Dothard v. Rawlison, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (citing Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 422 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971)) (noting also that an employer could prove that
it reasonably believed all or substantially all members of a classification would be unable to
safely and efficiently perform the job duties).
243. The law of termination would give more leeway to employers to terminate based on
race, which the BFOQ defense expressly prohibits. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). Yet, given
the difficulty of arguing that a race-based termination is related to a valid business reason,
the practical effect of that change would be negligible.

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\mlr102.txt

136

unknown

Seq: 48

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

25-NOV-08

13:37

[VOL. 68:89

satisfy the law’s reasonable business justification standard. For example, an employer that is able to show that a sex-based termination was
reasonably necessary to the essence of its business would be able to
show that the termination had a reasonable business justification.
Religious discrimination claims also have a unique defense that
permits an employer to avoid liability if it can prove that discrimination based on an employee’s religious observation or practice is necessary to avoid an “undue hardship” on the business.244 This defense is
broad as the Supreme Court has defined undue hardship in religious
discrimination claims as anything beyond a de minimis cost.245 The
law of termination’s business justification defense would likely make it
harder to show undue hardship, although that change may be warranted. The de minimis standard is often viewed as overly deferential
to employers’ interests in religious discrimination cases; the law of termination could address that criticism on a case-by-case basis, while
avoiding the strong employer opposition that has thus far stymied
more specific legislative solutions.246 In the end, however, religious
claims account for a small percentage of Title VII actions.247 Of more
relevance are the defenses available in mixed-motive and disparate impact cases.
(2) Mixed-motive Defenses
The second major class of employer defenses under Title VII is
associated with mixed-motive claims. Such claims occur when an employer relied on both legitimate and illegitimate reasons. The Supreme Court first recognized mixed-motive claims under Title VII in
its 1989 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins248 decision. In Price Waterhouse, a
majority of Justices also established a defense to mixed-motive claims:
once an employee proves that the employer relied in part on an illegitimate motive, the employer can avoid liability by proving that it
would have made the same decision absent that motive.249 In 1991,
244. Id. § 2000e(j).
245. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (involving
employer’s refusal to accommodate employee’s request not to work Saturdays and subsequent termination of employee for refusing to work on Saturdays).
246. See, e.g., Workplace Religious Freedom Act, S. 677, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005) (attempting to change definition of undue hardship to “significant difficulty or expense”).
247. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Charge Statistics, http://
www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2008) (indicating that religious discrimination claims made up only 3.4% of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
charges filed in fiscal year 2006).
248. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
249. Id. at 244–45. The plurality held that the employer may be liable if improper bias
was a “motivating part” in the challenged employment practice. Id. at 258. Two concur-
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Congress amended this affirmative defense by mandating that an employer would still be liable for violating Title VII even when it proved
that it would have made the same decision absent a discriminatory
motive,250 but limiting the remedy in those instances to declaratory
relief, certain injunctive relief, costs, and attorney’s fees.251
The law of termination would alter Title VII’s mixed-motive defense by employing a complete defense to liability similar to the Price
Waterhouse analysis.252 Eliminating Title VII’s limited remedial provision, although not trivial, would not prove fatal. An absolute affirmative defense loses some of the symbolic force of imposing liability,
albeit limited, on all employers that rely on impermissible factors. Yet,
as a practical matter, the monetary remedies currently available under
Title VII’s mixed-motive affirmative defense are so weak that they provide little incentive for plaintiffs to pursue cases that involve a strong
employer defense.
(3) Disparate Impact Defenses
One of the most complicated claims under Title VII provides,
perhaps ironically, the most straightforward comparison with the law
of termination. Disparate impact claims are unique because, unlike
other Title VII claims, they do not require a showing of intent. Instead, a prima facie disparate impact case consists of proof that an
otherwise neutral employment practice disproportionately burdened
a protected class of employees.253 If an employee proves this prima
facie case, the employer may show that the practice at issue is “job
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”254 If the employer satisfies this defense, it will avoid liability
unless the employee can demonstrate that the employer refused to
ring Justices would have required that improper bias be a “substantial factor.” Id. at
259–60 (White, J., concurring); id. at 265–66 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified the plurality’s “motivating factor” standard. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
250. Id.
251. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
252. See supra notes 121–125 and accompanying text.
253. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
Typically, the plaintiff must identify a specific employment practice that caused the disparate impact, although in certain instances the plaintiff need only point to the employer’s
general decision making process. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (stating that a particular practice need not be identified if elements of the decision making process cannot be
separated).
254. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
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use an alternative practice that met its business goal, but lacked a disparate impact.255
The meaning of the job-related and business necessity defense—
in combination with the alternate practices rebuttal—is susceptible to
multiple interpretations,256 but generally mirrors the law of termination’s reasonable business justification requirement. Both standards
focus on the extent to which an employer’s stated motivation is reasonably necessary for the normal operation of its business; thus, in
most instances, the outcomes under both standards will be the same.
The most significant difference is the burden of proof under each
standard. In contrast to the law of termination’s substantive standard,
which places the burden of proof on the employee, the employer has
the burden of proving business necessity under Title VII.257 This difference will be relevant in close cases, although an employer will generally present the same type of evidence under either standard.
Accordingly, the law of termination will do little to affect employers’
responses to potential disparate impact situations.258
b. Effect on Discrimination Claims Generally
The most controversial effect of eliminating Title VII’s explicit
prohibition against discriminatory terminations would be the symbolic impact. Replacing Title VII’s express antidiscriminatory language with the general law of termination would take away some of
the advantages that come from a clear statement of policy to root out
discrimination in the workplace. That cost, however, appears to be
lower than the benefits of the change.
Although the symbolism of Title VII’s express ban on discrimination still serves a purpose, it is less important than when the statute
was enacted. The social norms against discrimination, although far
from perfect, are well established. Unlike in 1964, employers today
are aware that discrimination is contrary to public policy, if not their
255. Id.; see also Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (explaining
the requisite elements of the employer’s defense and how the employee can rebut with the
alternative practice argument).
256. For commentary on the ambiguities and different interpretations of the business
necessity defense, see Ernest F. Lidge III, Financial Costs as a Defense to an Employment Discrimination Claim, 58 ARK. L. REV. 1, 27 (2005); Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business
Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L.
REV. 1479, 1516–20 (1996).
257. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
258. This analysis also applies to the BFOQ defense. See supra notes 241–243 and accompanying text.
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own sensibilities.259 Thus, the most current pressing need is not symbolism, but a workable regulatory scheme that actually results in less
discrimination.
The stress on pragmatism over symbolism diverges from recent
developments in Europe. Although European countries have long
had general unjust dismissal laws, they are now adding explicit antidiscrimination measures.260 One reason for this change has been the
large influx of immigrant workers to Europe, which has generated
more workplace discrimination.261 In contrast to the United States,
which has grappled with a heterogeneous workforce for some time,
the threat of discrimination in Europe is growing. As that threat
grows, the symbolic benefit of explicit antidiscrimination regulations
grows as well. Indeed, Europe’s experience illustrates the need for
policymakers to consider contextual differences—both across jurisdictions and over time in a single jurisdiction—when making regulatory
decisions.
The question, then, is how we can best reduce discriminatory
practices in the current American workplace. The general law of termination, although radical in its elimination of Title VII’s express prohibition against discriminatory terminations, would better satisfy that
statute’s antidiscrimination goals. For instance, the reasonable business justification requirement would continue to prohibit most terminations that currently violate Title VII. Discrimination generally
would not constitute a reasonable business justification; thus, most terminations that are unlawful under Title VII would also violate the law
of termination.262 Moreover, the law of termination could provide a
more effective means to eliminate discriminatory terminations. This
efficiency gain263 derives from the creation of simpler streamlined
regulations, decreased backlash, and reduced disincentive against hir259. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 921, 948 (1996) (citing survey results to support assertion that “overt discrimination has lost all social acceptance”).
260. Scarponi, supra note 135, at 705 (describing action under European Community
(“EC”) treaties).
261. Id. (noting also that one of the EC’s goals is to harmonize workplace rules of member states).
262. See McGinley, supra note 85, at 1514 (explaining that employer would have to prove
that it treated employees similarly to satisfy just cause standard). Like Title VII, this analysis could permit certain types of affirmative action programs. Johnson v. Transp. Agency,
480 U.S. 616, 626 (1987).
263. This represents “Kaldor-Hicks” economic efficiency, under which an alternative is
considered more efficient than the status quo if the winners under the alternative would be
willing to compensate the losers, although actual compensation is not necessary. See
Daniel A. Farber, What (If Anything) Can Economics Say About Equity?, 101 MICH. L. REV.
1791, 1795 (2003) (explaining “Kaldor-Hicks” economic efficiency analysis).
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ing workers in a protected class.264 The latter two reasons—backlash
and employer resistance to hiring workers in a protected class—are
particularly telling examples of the law of termination’s potential
benefits.
It is an unfortunate irony that deeming certain characteristics as
especially worthy of protection inevitably fosters resentment from
those not sharing those traits. The existence of backlash and types of
opposition, although lamentable, are important and should not be
discounted by those interested in rooting out discrimination.265 Hostility to antidiscrimination laws creates real hurdles to their enforcement.266 Employees who lack characteristics that Title VII was
primarily intended to protect often harbor deep resentment against
the perception that other employees have special rights.267 That perception is also shared by many employers, judges, and members of the
public. Moreover, employers frequently claim that they are reticent to
hire members of a protected class because such employees are difficult to fire.268
No matter the veracity of these sentiments, their existence decreases employment opportunities for protected workers.269 Opposi264. Eliminating at-will as the default also would provide employees who want to oppose
discrimination or pursue a Title VII action with more protection against employer retaliation. See Estlund, supra note 20, at 1678–79 (stating that at-will termination makes employees reluctant to speak-out against an employer’s discriminatory conduct for fear of
retaliation); supra note 21 and accompanying text.
265. See Befort, supra note 2, at 408–09 (noting that a unitary termination standard
could reduce resentment against antidiscrimination laws, which would reduce both tension
at work and societal conflicts); McGowan, supra note 94, at 164–67 (noting that leaving
certain workers unprotected by antidiscrimination laws can lower employment of protected workers and create resentment from unprotected workers).
266. See Nancy Levit, MegaCases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49 B.C.
L. REV. 367, 421 (2008) (citing studies showing that diversity training can create backlash
and negatively effect minority workers’ opportunities for promotion); McGinley, supra
note 85, at 1490 (stating that backlash “influence federal judges to limit the protections of
antidiscrimination statutes . . . [and] is partially responsible for both the curtailment of
federal statutory civil rights and the growth of state common law exceptions to the employment at will doctrine”); cf. Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work Settings, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287, 1299–1302 (2005) (stating that employees’
willingness to follow workplace rules is tied to their beliefs about whether the rules are
ethical).
267. See Estlund, supra note 20, at 1679–81 (explaining the resentment among members
of unprotected classes); Oppenheimer, supra note 259, at 948 (citing 1987 survey results
showing that 34% of white respondents objected to federal enforcement of antidiscrimination laws protecting black workers and 33% of white respondents had no interest in the
issue).
268. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 262–66 (1992); Estlund, supra note 20, at 1680.
269. “Protected” workers or employees refers to individuals who are minorities under a
particular Title VII classification. Although reverse discrimination claims are available
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tion to discrimination cases extends to litigation as well. Studies have
shown that employee claims brought under an antidiscrimination statute generally have a significantly lower chance of success than other
claims.270 Although this disparity may have multiple causes, it is difficult to dismiss backlash as a major factor. Indeed, it would be unreasonable to expect all factfinders and judges to be immune from the
hostile sentiments shared by so many others.
The law of termination would directly address this problem by
maintaining current prohibitions against discriminatory terminations
under a rule that applies equally to all employees, no matter their
characteristics. Replacing Title VII’s explicit protection for certain
characteristics—which fosters the misguided perception that only certain individuals are protected271—with a reasonable business justification rule would significantly reduce, although not eliminate, the focus
on discrimination in termination cases.272 The resulting decrease in
backlash would, among other things, remove many of the hurdles to a
successful argument that a termination was improperly motivated by
discrimination.273 Placing all termination claims under the same
framework would also reduce employers’ perception that it is more
difficult to fire protected employees.
The law of termination could decrease workplace discrimination
in other ways as well. For example, several studies have shown that
minority employees tend to discount the frequency of discriminatory
acts against them.274 In a form of cognitive dissonance, these employunder Title VII, McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976), the general perception is often that only minorities are protected.
270. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 44, 48 table 1 (2003) (finding statistically significant decreases in win rates for civil rights employment cases versus non-civil
rights cases).
271. See Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the Development
of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REV. 719, 732 (1991) (arguing that exceptions
to at-will doctrine were created in part due to the perception among judges “that only
white males under the age of forty lacked some kind of job protection”).
272. Employees may still argue that the employer was motivated by discrimination, but
only as evidence that a reasonable business justification did not exist.
273. See Estlund, supra note 20, at 1682 (suggesting that a background rule of just cause
and fair treatment may help enforcement of antidiscrimination policies); McGinley, supra
note 85, at 1518 (explaining that it would eliminate the need to prove the employer’s
intent and instead focus the inquiry on the employer’s behavior). But see Julie C. Suk,
Discrimination At Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 73, 75 (2007) (arguing, based on French experience, that universal just cause protection may increase discriminatory hiring).
274. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 48, at 887–88 & n.140 (discussing how stigmatized groups often under perceive discrimination and citing studies); Laura Beth Neilsen &
Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litiga-
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ees may be sensitive to discrimination faced by their class, but remain
disinclined to believe that they, personally, were victims of discrimination.275 This discounting hinders enforcement of Title VII because it
means that some victims will not oppose discriminatory acts.276 The
law of termination alleviates much of this problem because even those
employees who fail to perceive discrimination as the motive for their
termination are likely aware that there was no reasonable business justification for the decision. Thus, these employees would be much
more likely to pursue a claim under the law of termination than Title
VII.
Other employees, in contrast, may file discrimination claims even
though no discrimination actually occurred. When an employee views
a termination as unjust, she will often seek a reason and a remedy.
Particularly when employers provide no information about their motivation, discrimination often provides the most readily available answer.277 This search for an explanation results in unmeritorious
claims that give employees false hope, impose unnecessary litigation
costs on employers, waste judicial resources, and often overshadow
valid discrimination claims by making judges suspicious of all such
cases.278 The law of termination would address this problem by requiring the employer to state a business justification, which would reduce the need for employees to come up with their own, often
unmeritorious, explanations.
The law of termination’s potential effect on Title VII is deceptively simple. Legally, the proposal would greatly simplify termination
claims that allege discrimination. This simplification improves enforcement, but it also alters the perceptions of employers, employees,
and judges. This shift promises to alleviate hostility against claims of
discrimination and, in turn, make it easier for employees who are
truly victims of discriminatory acts to seek redress.
tion as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663, 682–83 (discussing reasons why employees
may underreport discrimination).
275. See Brake & Grossman, supra note 48, at 887–95 (explaining this phenomenon);
Jolls, supra note 39, at 1356–59 (discussing negative bias generally and employees unawareness that they are personally being subjected to general risks and harms in their
workplace).
276. See K.A. DIXON ET AL., A WORKPLACE DIVIDED: HOW AMERICANS VIEW DISCRIMINATION
AND RACE ON THE JOB 15 (2002) (finding that only 3% of employees who perceived unfair
treatment sued their employer).
277. See Fischl, Workplace Justice, supra note 21, at 262 (stating that it is the “unfairness of
the discharge itself that leads the employee to suspect a racial or gender aspect”).
278. Id. (“[T]he need to repackage unjust dismissal claims as discrimination claims
needlessly racializes many employment disputes while at the same time trivializing the real
but subtle and complex role of racial domination in the workplace.”).
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2. NLRA
Another dramatic change under the law of termination would be
its impact on terminations motivated by employees’ collective activity.
The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), pursuant to its enforcement of the NLRA, currently has exclusive authority to regulate
most private-sector collective activity279—an authority that the proposed law would eliminate with regard to terminations. Thus, the
NLRA and other exclusive administrative schemes raise further issues
concerning the law of termination’s impact.280 In addition to replacing existing statutory prohibitions against terminations, the law of termination would also eliminate a significant portion of certain
agencies’ enforcement power and jurisdiction. The NLRB is an extreme example of this usurpation; although many agencies either enforce or adjudicate private causes of action under a statute,281 few do
both. Thus, the law’s elimination of NLRA termination claims is
among the most extreme changes from an enforcement standpoint.
The extraordinary nature of this change poses special risks, but
promises extraordinary benefits as well.
Before addressing the law of termination’s effect on NLRA enforcement, it is important to identify its substantive impact. In one
respect, the replacement of NLRA termination cases is no different
than any other workplace law. Take, for example, an employer that
terminated employees for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging union activity—a motivation that Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA expressly prohibits.282 A challenge to this action under the law of
termination would generally provide the same outcome as NLRA litigation, as union animus would not constitute a reasonable business
279. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
280. Other agencies with exclusive authority to prosecute statutory claims include the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s enforcement of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 659–60 (2000), the Office of Special Counsel’s enforcement
of the Hatch Act (banning certain political activity by public employees) and violations of
federal workplace rules brought before the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”), 5
U.S.C. §§ 1212, 1216 (2006); 5 C.F.R. § 734.102 (2008). In contrast, although the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has authority to enforce Title VII
through investigations and prosecution of cases, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, -5, -12 (2000), the
EEOC lacks exclusive enforcement authority, as Title VII relies primarily on private enforcement. Eisha Jain, Note, Realizing the Potential of the Joint Harassment/Retaliation Claim,
117 YALE L.J. 120, 127 (2007).
281. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 1204(a) (providing the MSPB with authority to hear private
causes of action within its jurisdiction).
282. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000) (making it unlawful for an employer “by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization”).
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justification. Moreover, if the employer were motivated by both antiunion and legitimate reasons, the mixed-motive analysis under the law
of termination would be identical to the NLRA’s analysis.283 Under
both, the employer could escape liability if it can show that it would
have taken the same action absent the unlawful motivation.284
More significant is the law of termination’s impact on Section
8(a)(1) of the NLRA. Section 8(a)(1) prohibits employer actions that
have the likely effect, no matter the employer’s intent, of interfering
with employees’ NLRA rights.285 At first blush, the law of termination’s business justification defense could severely undermine Section
8(a)(1) claims, as employers’ intent is often a crucial factor in establishing a reasonable business justification. However, Section 8(a)(1)
jurisprudence has developed certain protections for employer autonomy that fits well with the law of termination analysis. Under longstanding NLRB and Supreme Court precedent, Section 8(a)(1) requires a balance of employees’ rights and employers’ business interests.286 Even when an employer’s action substantially interferes with
employees’ ability to exercise their rights under the NLRA, the NLRB
will not find a violation of Section 8(a)(1) if the employer has a strong
business justification for the action.
For instance, an employer will not violate Section 8(a)(1) when it
shuts down a plant because of union animus, even though that action
will typically chill employees’ willingness to unionize.287 The rationale
is that employers’ autonomy to decide whether to stay in business

283. See supra notes 121–125 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 121–125 and accompanying text.
285. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Section 7 of the NLRA protects employees’ right to “selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective-bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .” Id. § 157. Those
rights are enforced through Section 8(a)(1), which provides that “[i]t shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise” of their Section 7 rights. Id. § 158(a)(1). An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) when
its conduct tends to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their
Section 7 rights; evidence of intent is unnecessary. Retlaw Broad. Co. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d
1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1995).
286. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965)
(“[I]t is only when the interference with [Section] 7 rights outweighs the business justification for the employer’s action that [Section] 8(a)(1) is violated.”).
287. See id. (“[A]n employer has the right to terminate his business, whatever the impact
of such action on concerted activities, if the decision to close is motivated by other than
discriminatory reasons.”). The decision to close a plant may, under limited circumstances,
violate Section 8(a)(3). See id. at 274–76 (noting the possibility of such a violation).
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trumps that decision’s effect on employees’ labor rights.288 In contrast, where business interests are low relative to employee interests,
employer actions that interfere with employees’ NLRA rights will violate Section 8(a)(1).289 This analysis fits perfectly with the law of termination’s reasonable business justification requirement as both focus
on the strength of an employer’s rationale for terminating an
employee.
The effect on the NLRA’s enforcement is far more extreme. The
law of termination would remove all termination cases from the
NLRB’s jurisdiction, despite the agency’s exclusive authority over such
cases under current law. Although dramatic, this change aptly demonstrates the benefits of the law of termination.
The NLRB is supposed to provide expert enforcement of the
NLRA’s policies;290 however, its performance has long been the subject of criticism.291 Problems include the NLRB’s limited remedial authority, delay, and the political makeup of the agency, all of which
undermine enforcement of the NLRA’s goals. The law of termination
would do much to improve this situation. For example, the effectiveness of the NLRB’s current remedies—particularly its reinstatement
orders—would significantly benefit from the law of termination. Typically, the vast majority of employees who were awarded a right to reinstatement no longer work for their employer two years later.292 In
contrast, employees reinstated under collective-bargaining agreements, which almost always contain just cause protection, have much
higher success rates.293 This is not surprising, as the protection
288. Id. at 269 (“Whatever may be the limits of [Section] 8(a)(1), some employer decisions are so peculiarly matters of management prerogative that they would never constitute
violations of [Section] 8(a)(1), whether or not they involved sound business judgment.”).
289. See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 805 (1945) (holding that
employers cannot completely restrict workplace discussions among employees during nonwork time).
290. C.J. Krehbiel Co. v. NLRB, 844 F.2d 880, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“Congress has
charged the Board, a special and expert body, with the duty of judging the tendency of
electoral flaws to distort ‘the employees’ ability to make a free choice.’” (quoting Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers v. NLRB, 736 F.2d 1559, 1563–64 (D.C. Cir. 1984))).
291. For a discussion regarding some of the criticism against the NLRB, see Cynthia L.
Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1530–31 (2002)
[hereinafter Ossification]; Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA?,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 262, 268–74 (2008).
292. See Martha S. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge, 1988 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1, 28–30 (citing studies showing that only 21% of employees with reinstatement
orders from the NLRB still worked for their employers two years after the order).
293. See id. at 38–39 (noting one study finding that approximately 75% of reinstated
employees protected by a collective-bargaining agreement remained with their employer
two years later).
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against unjust dismissals reduces the ability of a resentful employer to
retaliate against the employee. Indeed, employers may take positive
action, such as emphasizing to its managers the need to avoid retaliating against returning employees, out of concern of avoiding further
liability.294
More directly, the available remedies under the law of termination—even with its limited damages295—would be far superior to the
current financial penalties available to the NLRB. The NLRB’s sole
monetary remedy is backpay; the agency lacks the authority to award
fines, compensatory damages, or punitive damages.296 By permitting
at least limited compensatory and punitive damages, the law of termination would make it more costly for an employer to terminate employees because of their collective activity and would increase
employees’ incentive to challenge such terminations.297 This change
is particularly important when terminated employees are able to find
new work quickly, because they would likely receive only a small or
nonexistent backpay award.298
By taking these cases out of the NLRB’s jurisdiction, the law of
termination could also avoid the delay that is often associated with the
agency’s adjudicatory process.299 Moreover, judges, rather than
NLRB members who have explicitly partisan appointments, would
hear law of termination actions. It is impossible to completely eliminate politics from litigation, but the NLRB’s constant reversals of its
own cases and its often openly political opinions would be significantly reduced.300
Removing termination claims under the NLRA does raise a potential problem concerning the NLRB’s authority over election and
other representational issues. Because a union can object to an election outcome based on antiunion terminations, the NLRB often adjudicates termination allegations as part of a representational
proceeding. These claims are important because terminating employ294. Fischl, Workplace Justice, supra note 21, at 267.
295. See supra Part III.E.
296. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)(2000); Estlund, Ossification, supra note 291, at 1552.
297. See supra notes 206–212 and accompanying text.
298. See NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307, 1316–17 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing interim earnings deduction).
299. See, e.g., NLRB, SEVENTY-FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR BOARD FOR
THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2006 table 23 (2006), available at http://
www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/brochures/Annual%20Reports/Entire2006Annual.pdf
(indicating that, in Fiscal Year 2006, the median number of days from the filing of a charge
to a Board decision in unfair labor practice cases was 739 days).
300. See Amber & Triplett, supra note 165, at AA-3 (discussing a group of controversial
NLRB rulings).
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ees due to their support for a union is among the most serious types of
election misconduct.301 Thus, the NLRB must be able to consider
such claims. The problem is the possibility that a single termination
would be argued in two separate proceedings; in one, the termination
would be part of a union’s case for overturning an election, and in the
other, the termination would be the basis for a law of termination
claim. That problem, however, is not serious.
In this situation, the NLRB would be permitted only to consider
the termination as evidence for its representation decision; it would
not have jurisdiction to provide a remedy to the employee. Moreover,
the NLRB’s or court’s initial finding on the employer’s motivation for
the termination would likely settle the issue, despite the possibility
that it would arise in a subsequent proceeding. For example, an
NLRB finding that the employer was not motivated by union animus
would likely suppress all but the most frivolous law of termination
claims. In contrast, an NLRB finding that the employer retaliated
against an employee’s union conduct would generally lead to settlement of any subsequent law of termination action. The possibility of
duplicative arguments or inconsistent outcomes would exist, but the
probability is low and is a small price to pay for a scheme that otherwise greatly simplifies termination disputes.302
A final issue with the law of termination’s assumption of unionrelated terminations is its effect on collective-bargaining agreements.
Currently, claims that a termination violated a collective-bargaining
agreement are either arbitrated303 or litigated in federal court under
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”)304—a
cause of action that currently preempts state breach of contract
claims.305 Substantively, the law of termination does little, if anything,
to change Section 301 claims, as a termination in violation of a contractual provision would presumptively fail the reasonable business
justification requirement.
301. See Jim Baker Trucking Co., 241 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 121, 122 (1979) (concluding
that employer’s unlawful terminations made a fair election impossible, as the “threat of
termination is a serious unfair labor practice, [and] the effectuation of such a threat is
even more serious”), enforced, 626 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1980).
302. The problem could be solved by placing exclusive federal authority over all workplace claims under a single statute and agency. See Hirsch, Regulatory Pragmatism, supra
note 16, at 28 (“The solution . . . is a universal law of the workplace—a federal law that
would establish the exclusive governance scheme for all workplace matters.”).
303. See Pyett v. Penn. Bldg. Co., Inc., 498 F.3d 88, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2007) (considering
arbitration provisions in collective-bargaining agreements).
304. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000).
305. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985).
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The law of termination, however, would affect the means of enforcing termination provisions under collective-bargaining agreements. Under the law, all terminations, including those arguably in
violation of a collective-bargaining agreement, must be arbitrated306
or brought in a court with competent jurisdiction.307 This enforcement scheme has several consequences. First, because termination
claims would no longer fall under the LMRA, the law of termination
avoids LMRA preemption conflicts that plague state-law-based just
cause proposals.308 Second, state court jurisdiction over law of termination cases would raise the possibility that claims involving a collective-bargaining agreement—which only federal courts can hear—
could be brought in two different forums.309 Joinder rules, however,
would permit parties to attach a law of termination claim to any related LMRA-governed claims, ensuring that the entire dispute would
be heard in the same, federal, forum.310 Moreover, the problem
could be completely avoided by limiting jurisdiction over law of termination claims to federal courts.311
In sum, the benefits of the law of termination apply to both union
and nonunion employees. Indeed, union employees would likely see
particularly large benefits from the law because its efficient and effective enforcement scheme promises great gains over NLRA adjudication. Although the law would radically alter the enforcement of
terminations currently governed by the NLRA, the result of that transformation would be improved protection for employees’ rights to engage in collective action.
B. Effect on Workplace Regulatory System
Although the aim of this Article is not to advocate an unjust dismissal protection on its merits, identifying the possible costs and bene306. See supra note 182.
307. See supra Part III.D.
308. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN § 39-2-912(2) (2007) (exempting employees covered by
collective-bargaining agreements); A.B. 3017, 1984 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2888(a) (Cal. 1984)
(requiring exhaustion of internal procedures); H.B. 5155, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(c)
(Mich. 1983) (excluding unionized employees); A.B. 1832, 199th Leg. § 1 (N.J. 1980) (excluding employees covered by collective-bargaining agreement with relevant grievance and
arbitration procedure).
309. For example, if a related set of facts involved both termination and non-termination claims under a collective-bargaining agreement, a state court would have jurisdiction
over the law of termination claim, but not the other claims. However, if the law of termination also covered discipline and other similar adverse employment actions, see supra note
17, this problem would largely dissipate because most related non-termination violations
would involve these types of actions.
310. FED. R. CIV. P. 18 (joinder rules).
311. See supra note 201.
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fits of the law of termination is important. Any change as dramatic as
the law of termination comes with costs, and it is worth considering
whether the change would do more harm than good. Moreover,
awareness of the possible costs and benefits, even if they are difficult
to quantify, helps to create a roadmap for pragmatic policymaking.
These considerations should inform both the creation of the law of
termination and subsequent evaluations of the law.
The costs and benefits of the law of termination are highly dependent on the specifics, including the law’s procedural and substantive
requirements, burdens of proof, remedies, and enforcement procedures. Even with such details spelled out, however, it is difficult to
gauge precisely the winners and losers.312 If there is any prediction
approaching certainty, it is that employers and employees will achieve
gains in some instances and losses in others. For instance, employers
would face the potential for more termination suits, yet benefit from
caps on damages and more predictable litigation.313 Some employees, conversely, may be worse off if the chance of winning an employment lawsuit lottery is diminished, while others may benefit if the
opportunity to challenge an unreasonable dismissal is enhanced, albeit with a lower maximum for monetary damages.
More important than an attempt to predict individual winners
and losers, however, is the need to identify the possible system-wide
gains over today’s workplace regulations. This Article argues that,
taken alone, the likely improvements in the enforcement of current
workplace policy goals makes the law of termination worth the effort.
Yet, other considerations are important as well.
1. Benefits of the Law of Termination
The most obvious gain from the universal law of termination
would be the dramatic reduction in the complexity of existing workplace regulations. As noted above, the system’s current patchwork of
laws significantly increases the costs of compliance and enforce312. See Don Bellante & Philip K. Porter, A Subjectivist Analysis of Government-Mandated
Employee Benefits, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 657, 665 (1990) (noting that because of imperfections in objective and subjective valuations of actors in the workplace, “scientific observers are never able to make valid judgments about the optimality of any package” of
government-mandated employee benefits).
313. See Krueger, supra note 13, at 645–46 (arguing that in states where courts have
significantly eroded the at-will default and employers face the potential of large damage
awards, employers are less resistant to a state just cause law which could reduce the “considerable uncertainty over the ownership of job property rights and over the penalties for
violations of those rights” under state common law).
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ment.314 This complexity also creates uncertainty that leaves parties,
especially employers, with little guidance on how to handle possible
terminations. Thus, the primary goal of the law of termination would
be to simplify the current termination regulatory system—a change
that would both improve enforcement and reduce compliance costs.
The law of termination would also begin to address the reality
that most terminations, whether made with or without cause, can create significant hardships for employees. The loss of a job often leads
to mental and physical health problems, as well as disruptions in family and social relationships.315 Indeed, the social costs associated with
the loss of jobs was a major factor in the enactment of the WARN and
its notice requirements for mass layoffs.316
Further, by increasing employees’ knowledge of, and willingness
to enforce, their legal rights,317 the law of termination would not only
help individual employees, but could also lead to social gains. Workplace information asymmetries are particularly detrimental to antiretaliation measures. Employees’ ignorance of their rights318
undermines their willingness to oppose or blow the whistle on employer conduct that may be damaging to society.319 Solidifying and
clarifying employees’ protection against unwarranted terminations
would likely increase their resistance to harmful employer actions.320
Businesses may also benefit from the law of termination. A broad
protection against unjust dismissals is likely to encourage employers to
inform workers of performance issues as they arise. Distaste for confrontation often leads managers to avoid talking to an employee, if
314. See supra Part I.
315. See St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates, supra note 17, at 67 & n.71 (noting mental and
physical health problems and citing studies).
316. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–09 (2000) (codifying WARN); Watson v. Mich. Indus. Holdings, Inc., 311 F.3d 760, 765 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that costs associated with widespread
layoffs in the 1970s and 1980s prompted the WARN’s enactment).
317. See supra notes 37–49 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
319. Protections for whistleblowers or prohibitions against retaliating against employees
for opposing discrimination serve society’s, as well as an individual employee’s, interests.
See Stebbings v. Univ. of Chicago, 726 N.E.2d 1136, 1140 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (stating that
the tort of retaliatory discharge “aims to strike a proper balance among employers’ interests in operating their businesses efficiently, employees’ interests in earning a livelihood
and society’s interests in seeing its public policies carried out”); Green v. Ralee Eng’g Co.,
960 P.2d 1046, 1052 (Cal. 1998) (stating that California’s whistleblower statute shows the
“Legislature’s interest in encouraging employees to report workplace activity that may violate important public policies that the Legislature has stated”).
320. See Estlund, supra note 20, at 1675–78 (arguing that employees are more likely to
challenge and question adverse employment actions when they are not subject to summary
discharge without cause).
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they talk to them at all, until termination is inevitable. The law of
termination’s procedural requirements, in combination with the need
to identify a reasonable business justification, would prompt managers
to document and communicate performance shortcomings with employees before termination occurs. This could increase productivity, as
some poorly performing employees would improve their work effort
to avoid termination.321 The law’s requirements may also spur other
employment practices that benefit businesses.322 Great Britain’s
wrongful termination laws, for example, have led to an expansion of
internal dispute resolution and “more efficient recruitment and discipline practices.”323
The potential gains from the law of termination’s reasonable business justification requirement are revealed, in part, by employers’ occasional support for unjust dismissal measures. That support is not
the norm, but may occur when current workplace regulations become, from employers’ perspective, distasteful enough to seek an alternative. For instance, Alan Krueger conducted a study showing that
states with more common law exceptions to the at-will default doctrine have an increased likelihood of seeing proposals for just cause
legislation.324 His explanation for this finding is that employers may
be supportive, or less resistant, to a just cause regime in states where
significant erosions of the at-will default pose a risk of large damage
awards.325 Krueger argues as well that employers’ support for a just
cause rule may result from their desire for more consistent and precisely defined legal requirements.326 This concern is significant because many state common law termination regimes create substantial
321. Employers that recognize the potential benefits of informing workers early about
problems are obviously free to do so now, as is the case in some workforces. Without a
requirement that employers discuss poor performance with workers, however, managers’
psychological resistance to confronting employees, among other factors, limit this practice.
322. See Weiler, supra note 185, at 189 (noting prospect of damage awards “provides
employers with a very strong incentive not to violate” employee rights).
323. McGinley, supra note 85, at 1522 (explaining that job security laws passed in Great
Britain led to the formalization of employment procedures).
324. Krueger, supra note 13, at 655–56 (noting up to a quadrupling of probability that
unjust dismissal law will be proposed).
325. Id. at 653 (noting also the similarity in the support by employee- and employergroups for just cause dismissal laws and workers’ compensation legislation); see also PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 1, § 11.04, at 11-19 (arguing that employers “historically have favored legislation as an alternative to common law liability when it seemed that
legislation would permit greater predictability of outcome and limit the size of damage
awards”).
326. Krueger, supra note 13, at 653 (“[M]any employers are willing to support unjust
dismissal legislation and accept a ‘just cause’ firing requirement in exchange for the implementation of a strict standard for employees to recover punitive damages and a consistent,
well-defined legal definition of unjust dismissals.”).
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uncertainty regarding employees’ rights to their jobs and the penalties
employers face for violating those rights.327 In the face of such uncertainty, unjust dismissal legislation represents a more economically efficient option, as it can create more predictable results, particularly
when it caps damage awards.328
Although Krueger’s conclusions are not above criticism,329 his
study shows the potential advantages of an unjust dismissal law versus
the complexity and uncertainty of today’s workplace rules. His focus
on the practical implications of workplace laws, particularly on the
behavior of employers, is also an excellent example of the type of
pragmatic consideration that policymakers should regularly take into
account.
2. Costs of the Law of Termination
Numerous objections to an unjust dismissal law exist, yet the primary focus has been the possible impact of such a law on the economy, employer autonomy, and litigation trends.330 It is difficult to
accurately forecast the effects of proposals such as the law of termination; however, both anecdotal and empirical evidence indicate that
predictions of significant harm are vastly overstated.
Virtually every industrial country other than the United States
protects employees against some form of unjust dismissal.331 Indeed,
the first country to provide such protection, in 1917, was Mexico332—a
country that many have cited as a significant threat to American
jobs.333 There does not appear to be evidence that just cause protections in these countries have created severe burdens on employers.334
Indeed, some studies have shown a strong correlation between job se327. See id. at 646, 650 (noting the uncertainties surrounding employees’ rights and
potential damage awards).
328. See id. at 646 (stating that uncertainty inhibits economic efficiency).
329. See generally Jack Stieber & Richard N. Block, Comment on Alan B. Krueger, “The Evolution of Unjust-Dismissal Legislation in the United States,” 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 792 (1992)
(commenting on Krueger’s findings).
330. See supra note 13.
331. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
332. See International Labour Organization, Profiles of National Legislation, Mexico,
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/info/termination/countries/mexico.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2008) (profiling Mexico’s unjust dismissal law).
333. See, e.g., Larry Swisher, Offshoring Services Work Could Eliminate 2.4 Million Jobs in U.S.
Cities, Report Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), Feb. 26, 2007, at A-10 (describing how offshoring
service jobs to countries such as Mexico will negatively affect employment rates of American workers).
334. Cf. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates, supra note 17, at 77 (stating that inquiries into
employers’ motivations for layoffs or reassignments “hardly imposes an oppressive burden
on employers. All they need do is establish almost any sort of rational, verifiable crite-
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curity and productivity.335 Moreover, virtually every state in this country has created significant exceptions to the at-will default.336 That
numerous countries and states have maintained some form of protection against unjust dismissals indicates that the law of termination
would be unlikely to create significant harm to the United States
economy.
Another objection to unjust dismissal prohibitions is that they
eliminate employers’ ability to manage their businesses. However, the
law of termination’s structure dampens this concern. The law’s substantive standard only prevents employers from terminating employees without a reasonable business justification. That requirement
leaves a large degree of deference to the employer.337 Indeed, many
collective-bargaining agreements, which often provide significant job
protection, contain management rights clauses that specifically guarantee an employer’s extensive right to operate the business without
interference.338
The existence of just cause protection in the vast majority of
American collective-bargaining agreements is illustrative.339 The
union experience indicates that employees generally prefer just cause
even if the trade-off is a decrease in wages.340 The costs to employers
rion—seniority, skills, past productivity, etc.—as the basis for their job determinations, and
they are practically impervious to challenge”).
335. Id. at 69 & n.79 (citing studies). Although one could argue that employers would
voluntarily provide more job security if it increased productivity, that argument ignores
other factors involved with termination decisions. Most important is that the supervisors
and managers often place more emphasis on autonomy and other issues that directly affect
them, rather than productivity, profitability, and other general business goals, which have a
less direct impact on their work lives. See, e.g., McGinley, supra note 85, at 1488 (explaining
that economic analysis of employer behavior is sometimes based on “questionable assumptions” about employer interests); Schwab, supra note 26, at 26 (describing differences between supervisors’ and shareholders’ interests and that “[p]ersonality conflicts and power
trips may lead supervisors to fire valuable and productive employees”).
336. Morriss, At-Will, supra note 23, at 682 & n.8 (noting that all but two states limited
employment at-will as of 1993).
337. See supra notes 137–138 and accompanying text.
338. See Summers, supra note 130, 501–02 (explaining some of the possible retained
rights of management under collective-bargaining agreements); cf. St. George Warehouse,
Inc., 341 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 904, 907, 927 (2004) (finding employer’s proposal for broad
management rights clause—which would allow it complete discretion over hiring, promotions, discipline for cause, demotions, transfers, layoffs, recalls, setting productivity standards, contracting with third-parties to supply personnel, closing, expanding, or relocating
its facility, ceasing any job, and changing methods of operation—to be lawful).
339. See Abrams & Nolan, supra note 14, at 594 n.1 (noting that 94% of collective-bargaining agreements reviewed by the Bureau of National Affairs in 1983 contained a just
cause or cause provision).
340. See St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates, supra note 17, at 68 (stating that lower wages for
greater job security is a “time-honored tradeoff among unionized workers”). Just cause
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of collectively bargained just cause provisions also seem insignificant,
as employers almost never seek to eliminate such measures in negotiations.341 Similarly, one study that gave a particularly large estimate of
the costs to employers of just cause litigation and liability, qualified
that calculation by noting that such costs “are dwarfed in comparison
with standard expenses incurred as a result of labor turnover.”342
A further concern with unjust dismissal protection is the possibility that it would substantially increase litigation. It is difficult to accurately predict the litigation effect, as it is dependent upon highly
uncertain variables such as the extent to which employers change
their termination practices in response to the new law, employees’
willingness to use the new cause of action, employees’ ability to find a
new job, and judges’ interpretation of the new law. However, the
most probable outcome would look very similar to the status quo, as
the law of termination would be unlikely to significantly increase the
number of termination-related claims.343 Indeed, the law could actually decrease the level of such litigation.
Although this result may seem counterintuitive, it is not surprising given the current state of our workplace regulatory system. As
noted, numerous potential causes of action exist and any employee
who wants to dispute her termination can easily pursue multiple
claims. Replacing those claims with a single law would essentially
streamline litigation that is already occurring. Moreover, many employers have adopted a de facto just cause regime in an attempt to
avoid liability under the current system of workplace laws.344 The law
protection could lower the demand for labor because it is more expensive and could increase the supply of labor because jobs are more attractive with the additional security—
this increase in supply places downward pressure on wages. Id. (citing Harrison, supra note
35).
341. Id.
342. JAMES N. DERTOUZOS & LYNN A. KAROLY, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, LABORMARKET RESPONSES TO EMPLOYER LIABILITY 36 (1992). Other studies have estimated much
lower costs than the RAND study. See David H. Autor et al., The Costs of Wrongful-Discharge
Laws, in 2 ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 322, 323, 326 (John J. Donohue III
ed., 2007) (criticizing conclusions of RAND study).
343. See supra note 104, at 1842 (maintaining that changes in termination law are unlikely to increase litigation because “expanded liability may deter future abusive or retaliatory discharges, thus limiting the number of potential claims . . . [and] the development of
clear standards of what constitutes an unjust discharge will encourage out-of-court
settlement”).
344. See PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL, supra note 1, § 11.27, at 11-116 (“[M]ost employers respond to the patchwork quilt of employee protection . . . with something close to an
internally imposed just cause requirement. If employers thus already suffer the detriments
of just cause protection, they might as well have the benefits of caps on damages and the
other procedural trade-offs in the model act.”). But see Katherine V.W. Stone, Revisiting the
At-Will Employment Doctrine: Imposed Terms, Implied Terms, and the Normative World of the Work-
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of termination would merely codify that trend. It would also make
employers more reticent to terminate employees in close cases,345 and
fewer terminations means less litigation.
Finally, the law’s informational requirements may result in fewer
terminations. Because many current lawsuits result from employees
looking to explain their termination, the law’s requirement that employers state the reason for their termination decisions would dissuade some, although certainly not all, employees from pursuing a
claim.346 Additionally, the mandated warnings about performance
problems would prompt some employees to improve their work effort,
thereby avoiding termination and the litigation it could generate.
There is a dearth of empirical evidence on the link between the
availability of termination claims and litigation rates—not unexpectedly, given the complex nature of American workplace law. However,
Montana’s experience in moving from a common law regime to the
WDEA’s just cause protection is informative, albeit imperfect. Like
most states, Montana had several common law claims available to a
discharged employee, including tort actions for violations of public
policy and the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing.347 The availability of a tort-based, rather than contractual, good faith and fair dealing claim348 was unusual and made Montana’s common law regime
less employer-friendly than most states. Because of their dissatisfacplace, 36 INDUS. L.J. 84, 95 (2007) (explaining that some employers are returning to an atwill termination regime to preserve flexibility in employment contracts).
345. See McGinley, supra note 85, at 1519 (noting that just cause law’s potential increase
in costs to business would discourage terminations lacking cause); Summers, supra note
130, 507–08 (explaining how collective-bargaining protections against unjust discipline
have deterred employers from sanctioning union workers without justification). Such a
threat may also deter employers from terminating employees where the justification issue
is close; that effect on marginal decisions is surely a cost, but one that is offset by the
benefits of the law.
346. The law could also result in more informative job recommendations. See Robert B.
Fitzpatrick, The Future of Employment Discrimination Law as the United States of America Enters
the 21st Century, 1997 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT
LAW 885, 892 (1997) (explaining the positive effect that a just cause standard would have
on job references). That information could lead to more defamation suits by employees,
although employees who are inclined to challenge that information would have most likely
done so through a claim under the law of termination.
347. See, e.g., Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127, 129 (Mont. 1980) (public policy); Gates
v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063, 1066–67 (Mont. 1980) (good faith).
348. See, e.g., Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1112 (Cal. 2000) (providing an
example of how other states apply only contract law to employee termination claims, not
tort law). This distinction is important, as the damages available are solely contractual and
do not include tort awards for emotional distress or punitive damages. Id. at 1095. Montana had rejected other claims commonly available in most states, however, such as a claim
that a termination violated an implied contractual provision. Reiter v. Yellowstone County,
627 P.2d 845, 849 (Mont. 1981).
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tion with this regime, Montana employers generally supported enactment of the WDEA and its preemption of those common law
claims.349 Although Montana has a somewhat unusual common law
history, its post-WDEA experience should provide some sense of the
law of termination’s impact on national litigation trends.
That impact appears to be small. One study of the WDEA showed
that the number of wrongful termination claims brought before and
after the statute’s enactment was virtually identical.350 Importantly,
when litigation did occur, WDEA cases took significantly less time
than pre-WDEA cases.351 Perhaps surprisingly, the shorter duration
does not look to be the result of the WDEA’s preference for arbitration, as few litigants—either employers or employees—sought arbitration. Rather, by streamlining termination-related claims and
simplifying legal standards, the WDEA may have made it easier to resolve disputes.352 Similarly, the WDEA’s cap on damages353 may have
contributed to the shorter timeframe by reducing employees’ incentive to engage in expensive and time-consuming litigation.354
Whatever the reason, the WDEA appears to have reduced litigation, not
increased it, and it certainly did not result in the significant costs that
some have associated with just cause protection.355 Thus, moving
from a system with numerous wrongful termination claims to a single
unjust dismissal claim does not seem to harm—and could benefit—
adjudicatory resource concerns.
The WDEA’s impact on Montana’s economy also appears benign.
Perhaps because the WDEA decreased the potential for large awards
and simplified the previous common law system, its impact on busi349. See supra notes 55–68 and accompanying text.
350. See Jarsulic, supra note 192, at table 1 (approximating the number of termination
cases prior to and after WDEA’s enactment). Jarsulic examined court decisions involving
terminations that occurred between 1983 and 1995, although he was unable to obtain all
cases. Id. at 110–11. According to his data set, there were approximately 0.41 terminations
per month before the WDEA’s enactment that resulted in a court decision, and 0.43 terminations after the WDEA’s enactment that resulted in a court decision. See id. at table 1
(listing the number of termination cases before and after the WDEA’s enactment by year,
which can be divided to determine approximate number of termination cases each
month). In addition, Jarsulic estimated that his sample missed more pre-WDEA cases than
post-WDEA cases. See id. at 111 n.24. Thus, it is possible that there were fewer cases
brought under the WDEA than the previous common law regime.
351. See id. at table 1 (reporting that the median duration of wrongful termination litigation was four years before the WDEA and two years after the WDEA).
352. Id.
353. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905 (2007); see also Jarsulic, supra note 192, at 112–17 &
tables 2–3 (noting the limitations on damages and providing statistics).
354. Id. at 112.
355. See supra note 342 and accompanying text.
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nesses and employment levels in Montana has been positive. For instance, stock prices for publicly traded companies centered in
Montana increased as passage of the WDEA became more likely—a
result that mirrored employers’ support for the legislation.356 Similarly, the WDEA appears to have increased employment in Montana,
completely negating the negative employment effect associated with
the earlier rise in common law termination claims.357 Studies looking
at other types of unjust dismissal claims across the United States confirm that such litigation is unlikely to have a significant negative effect
on the economy.358
Although impossible to determine with certainty, implementation of a broad reasonable business justification requirement for all
terminations is unlikely to negatively impact the national economy,
most businesses, or the court system—to the contrary, the law could
have a positive effect. Given the likely benefits of the law of termination,359 the lack of any significantly harmful consequences provides
further support for a radical modification of our current approaches
for regulating terminations.
V. CONCLUSION
Today’s termination regulatory scheme is broken. It consists of
multiple statutes, regulations, and common law rules derived from
federal, state, and local governments. Even when these laws cover similar aspects of the employment relationship, they often impose different requirements. Moreover, the laws’ enforcement schemes are as
fractured as the laws themselves. The same set of facts can often
prompt multiple claims that must be pursued in different forums.
The result is a system of laws that is difficult to understand, follow, and
enforce.
Nowhere is this problem more acute than the laws governing terminations. Although encompassing a single workplace action, the
356. Steven E. Abraham, Can a Wrongful Discharge Statute Really Benefit Employers?, 37 INREL. 499, 515–16 (1998).
357. See Bradley T. Ewing et al., The Employment Effect of a Good Cause Discharge Standard in
Montana, 59 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 17, 26–28 (2005) (finding that creation of common
law wrongful discharge actions lowered Montana’s annual rate of employment growth by
an average of 0.46 percentage points per year and that the WDEA increased employment
growth rate by 0.47 percentage points per year).
358. See, e.g., Autor et al., supra note 342, at 337–38 (finding no significant effect on
employment levels or wages caused by public policy and good faith exceptions to at-will
default, while finding that implied contract exception had small negative impact on employment and small positive impact on wages).
359. See supra notes 314–329 and accompanying text.
DUS.
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morass of federal, state, and local laws has created a confusing and
often ineffective governance system. This complexity, however, is unnecessary. Terminations, in particular, provide an opportunity to cut
through the thicket of laws and establish instead a relatively straightforward scheme to govern the end of the employment relationship.
The path to salvation is tied to the one common theme shared by
today’s disparate set of termination laws—the need to provide some
level of protection for employers’ business autonomy. The proposed
solution is to create a universal law of termination that would reflect
the concern for employer autonomy via a requirement that all terminations have a reasonable business justification. This requirement explicitly protects the concern for business autonomy in existing laws,
without their discordant patchwork of standards. By implementing a
single standard that governs all terminations, the law of termination
would be much easier to understand, follow, and enforce than the
current system.
More generally, the law of termination would integrate governance of terminations both vertically and horizontally. Vertical integration would occur by replacing all state governance of terminations
with exclusive federal authority. This change would virtually eliminate
the potential for termination claims to fall under multiple jurisdictions and forums. Moreover, the law would horizontally integrate termination claims by replacing all current federal laws regulating
terminations with the reasonable business justification requirement.
This would eliminate the complex federal system of termination standards and ensure that enforcement of the law occurs through a single
scheme. The effect of those changes would be a substantial reduction
in the extraordinary complexities of current termination laws and superior achievement of those laws’ policy goals—ironically by replacing
those laws with a single law of termination.
The law of termination is no panacea, as the complexities of the
workplace make any regulatory system inherently imperfect. This reality underscores the need for policymaking to seek not perfection,
but pragmatism. Policymakers should avoid overly idealistic notions
of their regulatory power and instead attempt to assess likely outcomes. This pragmatic approach is severely lacking in the current
workplace regulatory system. Little, if any, consideration has been
given to how the system as a whole works and whether it can be improved. The law of termination partially fills that gap.
Although it is unlikely that a proposal this ambitious would ever
be fully adopted, it advances an important point: the goal of workplace regulation should be actual enforcement, not theoretical aspira-
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tion. Thus, even limited pragmatic reforms—such as eliminating
some of the federal/state overlap or streamlining regulations within a
given jurisdiction—would be a step in the right direction and lay the
groundwork for more efficient and effective rules in the future. In
contrast, the failure to make any attempt at pragmatic rulemaking
would maintain and possibly expand the ineffectiveness of our workplace regulatory system. The law of termination is an attempt to avoid
that fate.

